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UNIVERSITY  OF CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY  AND NBER 
What  Ends  Recessions? 
1. Introduction 
The  Employment  Act of  1946 set  as the  goal  of  government  economic 
policy the maintenance  of reasonably full employment  and stable prices. 
Yet, nearly 50 years later, economists  seem strangely unsure  about what 
to tell policymakers  to do  to end  recessions.  One  source  of this uncer- 
tainty  is  confusion  about  how  macroeconomic  policies  have  actually 
been  used  to  combat  recessions.  In  the  midst  of  the  most  recent 
recession,  one  heard  opinions  of  fiscal policy  ranging  from  the  view 
that no  recession  has  ever  ended  without  fiscal expansion  to the  view 
that  fiscal stimulus  has  always  come  too  late.  Similarly, for monetary 
policy  there was  disagreement  about whether  looser  policy  has been  a 
primary  engine  of  recovery  from  recessions  or  whether  it  has  been 
relatively  unimportant  in these  periods. 
This  paper  seeks  to  fill  in  this  gap  in  economists'  knowledge  by 
analyzing  what  has  ended  the  eight  recessions  that  have  occurred  in 
the  United  States since  1950. In particular, it analyzes  whether  mone- 
tary and fiscal policies  have  helped  or hindered  previous  recoveries. By 
quantifying  the role of policy,  the paper seeks to identify  how  much  of 
recoveries  is attributable to government  action and how  much  to other 
factors  such  as  self-correction  and  fortuitous  shocks.  By  determining 
which  policies  were  the  most  effective  in  ending  past  recessions,  the 
paper  tries to  discern  the  likely  efficacy of  policy  today  and  in  reces- 
sions  to come. 
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Our main finding is that monetary  policy has been  the source of most 
postwar  recoveries.  While  limited  fiscal actions  have  occurred  around 
most  troughs,  these  actions  have  almost  always  been  too  small  to 
contribute much to economic  recovery. In contrast, monetary  policy has 
typically  moved  toward  expansion  shortly after the  start of most  reces- 
sions and appears to have contributed,  on average, almost two percent- 
age  points  to  real  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  growth  in  the  four 
quarters  following  the  trough.  Even  if  one  accounts  for  the  fact  that 
tight  monetary  policy  before  the  peak  continues  to  depress  the  econ- 
omy  for  several  years,  the  net  effect  of  monetary  policy  in  ending 
recessions  has been  substantial. 
We reach this conclusion  through  a series of steps. Section 2 analyzes 
the record of policy  actions  since  1950. It shows  that both nominal  and 
real interest rates fell by several percentage  points before most troughs. 
In  contrast,  the  ratio  of  the  high-employment  surplus  to  trend  GDP 
typically  fell slightly  around  troughs, but only  rarely moved  more than 
a percentage  point. 
Section  3 analyzes  the  sources  of  these  policy  changes.  It examines 
the  stated  motivations  of policymakers  to see  if the changes  in interest 
rates and in the high-employment  surplus during recessions and around 
troughs  were  taken  largely  to  end  the  recessions  or for other  reasons. 
We find that nearly  all of the monetary  changes  and most  of the fiscal 
changes  were  genuinely  antirecessionary.  Interestingly,  we  find  that 
many of the largest discretionary fiscal actions taken in the postwar  era, 
such  as the  1964 tax cut and  the Nixon  "New  Economic  Policy," were 
not  antirecessionary  measures,  but  expansionary  actions  taken  when 
policymakers  were  dissatisfied  with  the pace of growth. 
Section  4  examines  the  likely  effects  of  the  antirecessionary  actions 
we  identify.  Using  estimates  of the effects of policy both from our own 
regressions  and  from Data Resources  Incorporated's  forecasting  model, 
we  estimate  the  contributions  of  monetary  and  fiscal policy  to  reces- 
sions  and  recoveries.  Although  there  is  substantial  variation  in  the 
estimates  of  policies'  impact,  the  results  suggest  that  monetary  policy 
has been  crucial in ending  recessions, while  fiscal policy has contributed 
very  little.1 
Section  5  investigates  two  additional  issues  raised  by  our  analysis. 
The first issue is the overall stabilization record of policy. We argue that 
there is little evidence  that discretionary  policy  has had a large stabiliz- 
ing  influence,  and  that  there  are several  important  episodes  in  which 
1.  Perry  and  Schultze  (1993)  also  investigate  the  sources  of  recoveries.  They  reach 
conclusions  generally  similar to ours. What Ends Recessions?  ?  15 
expansionary  policy  has  exacerbated  fluctuations.  The  second  issue  is 
the  persistence  of  output  movements.  We find  that  the  component  of 
fluctuations  that is due  to shifts in monetary  and fiscal policy  is highly 
persistent  and  accounts  for  a  large  part  of  the  persistence  of  overall 
output  movements. 
2. Policy  Actions  in Recessions  and Recoveries 
2.1 INDICATORS  OF POLICY 
To analyze  whether  policy  could  account  for recoveries,  it is necessary 
to examine  the behavior  of policy  during recessions  and recoveries. We 
examine  two  indicators  of  monetary  policy.  The  first  is  simply  the 
quarterly change  in the nominal  federal funds  rate.2 Throughout  much 
of  the  postwar  period,  the  federal  funds  rate  has  been  the  primary 
proximate  instrument  of  monetary  policy.  And  even  during  periods 
when  it was  not, such as the  1950s and  1979-1982,  the Federal Reserve 
placed  considerable  emphasis  on  "money  market conditions"-that  is, 
changes  in  nominal  interest  rates-in  setting  policy.  Cook  and  Hahn 
(1989)  and  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992)  document  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  can  control  the  federal  funds  rate  in  the  short  run,  and 
Bernanke and Blinder present  a variety of evidence  that innovations  in 
the funds  rate are largely  due  to changes  in monetary  policy. 
Our second  indicator  of monetary  policy  is the  estimated  change  in 
the  real funds  rate. Theory  predicts  that  it is  the  real rather than  the 
nominal  rate that is relevant  for economic  activity. The fact that expan- 
sionary monetary  policy  lowers  nominal  interest rates strongly  suggests 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  influences  real  rates.  But  because  expected 
inflation  may  change  systematically  over  the  course  of  recessions  and 
recoveries,  it  is  important  to  examine  explicitly  the  behavior  of  real 
rates. 
Our  procedure  for  estimating  the  real  funds  rate  follows  Mishkin 
(1981). We first compute  the ex post real rate as the difference between 
the nominal  rate and the change  in the logarithm  of the GDP deflator.3 
We  then  regress  the  ex post  real rate on  a constant,  a time  trend,  the 
current and the first four lagged  values  of the nominal rate, and the first 
2. Unless otherwise noted, all data are from Citibase  (Dec. 1993 update). The federal 
funds rate data for 1950-1954  are described  in Romer  and Romer  (1993). 
3. Because  the federal funds rate is a very short-term  rate, the relevant  inflation  rate for 
computing the real rate for a quarter  is inflation within that quarter.  Therefore,  we 
compute the ex post real rate for quarter t  as  it -  4[ln((Pt+1  + Pt)/2) -  ln((Pt + 
Pt-_)/2)], where i is the nominal funds rate and P is the GDP deflator. 16  ROMER  &  ROMER 
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four  lags  of  inflation  and  real  GDP  growth.4  The  sample  period  is 
1951:1 to  1993:2. The  estimated  values  of  the  ex ante  real rate are the 
fitted  values  of  this  regression.  Figure  1  shows  our  estimates  of  the 
ex ante real federal funds  rate along  with  the nominal  rate. 
Our measure of discretionary fiscal policy is the change  in the ratio of 
the high-employment  surplus to trend or potential  GDP.5 This measure 
is  shown  in  Figure  2.  The  rationale  for  using  the  high-employment 
surplus  is the  standard  one  that it adjusts  for the  impact  of  economic 
activity  on  receipts  and  expenditures.  Because  of  this  adjustment,  the 
high-employment  surplus  can differentiate  fiscal actions  taken  deliber- 
ately in response  to recessions  from those  that occur automatically. The 
high-employment  surplus, however,  is not a perfect measure  of discre- 
tionary  fiscal  changes  because  some  actions  may  have  more  or  less 
effect  on  the  economy  than  their  impact  on  the  high-employment 
surplus  would  suggest.  Therefore, in the  analysis  of fiscal policy  in the 
next  two  sections,  we  discuss  temporary  tax changes,  investment  tax 
credits,  and  other  factors  that  might  cause  the  change  in  the  high- 
employment  surplus  to be  a misleading  measure  of  the  expansionary 
stance of fiscal policy. 
4. To prevent the period t  value of the GDP deflator from entering the first lag of 
inflation,  the lagged values of inflation  are computed simply as 4[ln(Pt_l) -  In(Pt-2)], 
4[ln(P_2) -  ln(Pt_3)], and so  on, rather than in  the more complex way  used  to 
calculate  current  inflation described  in footnote 3. Using the more complex definition 
has essentially  no effect on the estimated  real interest  rate series. 
5. For  the period since 1955,  the data are from the Congressional  Budget Office.  The data 
for 1950-1954  are described  in Carlson  (1987). What  Ends  Recessions?  ?  17 
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Although  it  is  useful  to  separate  out  the  automatic  changes  in  the 
surplus  that  are  caused  by  economic  activity  from  the  discretionary 
changes,  the  automatic  changes  are nevertheless  interesting.  It is  cer- 
tainly  possible,  for example,  that automatic  stabilizers are important  to 
recoveries.  For this reason  we  also  examine  the  change  in the  ratio of 
the automatic surplus to trend GDP; we  measure  the automatic compo- 
nent  of the  surplus simply  as the difference between  the actual surplus 
and the high-employment  surplus.6 
2.2 RESULTS 
2.2.1 Monetary Policy  Table 1 reports the behavior  of the federal funds 
rate  during  recessions-specifically,  from  the  times  of  peaks  in  real 
GDP to  the  quarter after troughs.7  The  top  half  of Table 1 shows  the 
change  in  the  nominal  rate; the  bottom  half  shows  the  change  in  the 
real rate. 
Table 1 shows  that interest rates fall sharply in recessions.  The falls in 
the nominal  funds rate are particularly consistent: 28 of the 33 entries in 
the  top  portion  of Table 1 are negative.  The only  significant  exception 
to  the  pattern  of  falling  nominal  rates  occurred  in  1974,  when  the 
Federal  Reserve  moved  to  sharply  tighter  policy  even  though  real 
6.  For  the  actual  budget  surplus,  we  use  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts 
measure  of the federal surplus. 
7. Because our focus is on movements  in aggregate  output,  we  use the dates of the peaks 
and  troughs  in real GDP rather than  National  Bureau of  Economic  Research (NBER) 
peaks and  troughs.  The two  sets of dates are very  similar, however. 18  ROMER  & ROMER 
output  was  falling.  Even  during  this  recession,  however,  the  overall 
movement  in  the  funds  rate was  a large  decline.  The  average  decline 
between  the  peak  in  output  and  one  quarter  after  the  trough  is  3.4 
percentage  points.  For  comparison,  the  standard  deviation  of  move- 
ments  in  the  nominal  funds  rate for the  full  sample  is  1.0 percentage 
point for one-quarter changes, and 2.3 percentage  points for four-quarter 
changes.  Thus, the  declines  in recessions  are large. 
The  bottom  half  of  Table  1  shows  that  real  interest  rates  also  fell 
during these  recessions.  In all eight episodes,  the estimated  real rate fell 
Table 1  THE FEDERAL  FUNDS RATE IN RECESSIONS 
Change  in nominal rate (percentage  points) 
Date 
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Table  2  THE  FEDERAL  FUNDS  RATE  IN RECOVERIES 
Change  in nominal rate (percentage  points) 
Date 


























-0.22  7.74 






























2.27  4.67  0.95 
between  the peak and the quarter after the trough.  The declines  in the 
real rate are somewhat  smaller and  less consistent  than  the  falls in the 
nominal  rate, however.  For example,  the average  decline  is just slightly 
over 2 percentage  points.8 
Once a recovery has begun,  there is a moderate  tendency  for both the 
nominal  and  real funds  rates to rise. Table 2 shows  the  changes  in the 
nominal  and  real  federal  funds  rates  in  the  second  through  fifth 
quarters  after troughs.  About  two-thirds  of  these  entries  are positive, 
8. Section 4.3 shows that the declines in output, prices, and expected inflation during  recessions relative to their normal behavior would have caused only modest falls in 
nominal interest rates, and essentially no change in real rates, if the Federal  Reserve 
had kept the money growth rate fixed in the face of these movements. Thus, even if 
we adopted measures  of monetary  policy that did not attribute  these parts of changes  in interest rates to policy, we would still find that monetary  policy was the source of 
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with  an average rise of both the nominal  and the real rate during  these 
periods  of about  1 percentage  point.  And  although  the  relevant  num- 
bers are not  reported  in  the  tables, the  same  general  tendency  toward 
moderate  interest  rate increases  continues  through  the  second  year of 
recoveries. Table 2 also shows  that the 1991 experience  is quite unusual. 
Rather than rising as is typical, both real and nominal  rates fell substan- 
tially after the trough. 
This examination  of movements  in interest rates suggests  that mone- 
tary  policy  could  play  a  critical  role  in  recoveries:  There  are  large, 
consistent  declines  in  interest  rates  during  recessions.  Whether  these 
declines  reflect  deliberate  countercyclical  policy,  and  whether  their 
timing  and  magnitude  are  consistent  with  the  view  that  they  are 
important  in recoveries,  are questions  that we  address  in the next  two 
sections. 
2.2.2  Fiscal  Policy  Table  3  reports  the  change  in  the  ratio  of  the 
high-employment  surplus  to  trend  GDP  from  peaks  to  five  quarters 
after troughs. These data do not show  any pattern of discretionary fiscal 
policy  as consistent  or strong  as the  declines  in interest  rates in reces- 
sions. The average  cumulative  change  in the high-employment  surplus 
to  GDP  ratio  from  the  peak  to  one  quarter after  the  trough  is  -0.7 
percentage  points.  However,  there  is great variation  around  this aver- 
age, with some cumulative  changes  being large and positive,  and others 
being  large and negative.  To put the average change  in perspective,  the 
standard  deviation  of  movements  in  the  high-employment  surplus  to 
GDP ratio for the  full  sample  is 0.6 percentage  points  for one-quarter 
changes  and  1.1 percentage  point  for four-quarter changes.  Thus,  the 
average fall during recessions  is not large relative to typical movements 
in the high-employment  surplus to GDP ratio. 
To the  extent  that there is any  systematic  pattern  in deliberate  fiscal 
policy,  it is that  policy  is generally  expansionary  around  troughs.  For 
example,  in  every  recession  except  the  one  immediately  after  the 
Korean  War, the  ratio  of  the  high-employment  surplus  to  GDP  fell 
between  two  quarters  before  the  trough  and  the  quarter  after  the 
trough;  19 of  the  24 individual  changes  for these  quarters were  nega- 
tive.  The  overall  shifts  over  these  three  quarters were  generally  about 
1% of  GDP.  Thus,  it  does  appear  that  fiscal  policy  becomes  slightly 
expansionary  late in recessions. 
The  record  of  automatic  fiscal  policy  is  decidedly  more  promising 
than that of discretionary  fiscal policy.  Table 4 shows  the change  in the 
automatic  surplus to GDP ratio around  the eight  troughs  since  1950. As 
would  be  expected,  the  automatic  surplus  to  GDP  ratio  consistently What  Ends  Recessions?  ?  21 
declines  during  recessions.  These  automatic  falls  in  the  surplus  are 
moderately  large;  the  average  cumulative  decline  in  the  automatic 
surplus to GDP ratio from the peak to the quarter after the trough is 1.6 
percentage  points.  For comparison,  the  standard  deviation  of  changes 
in  the  automatic  surplus  to  GDP  ratio  is  0.3  percentage  points  for 
one-quarter changes  and 0.9 percentage  point  for four-quarter changes. 
This  simple  examination  of  the  data  suggests  that  automatic  fiscal 
policy  is more  likely  to have  affected  recoveries  than  has discretionary 
policy.  Unless  the  effects  of  modest  changes  in  deliberate  fiscal policy 
are large, or there  are consistently  important  shifts in fiscal policy  that 
are not  reflected  in  the  high-employment  surplus,  discretionary  fiscal 
policy  cannot  have  played  a  central  role  in  ending  downturns  or  in 
Table  3  THE  HIGH-EMPLOYMENT  SURPLUS  IN RECESSIONS 
AND RECOVERIES 
Change  in ratio of high-employment  surplus to trend GDP 
(percentage  points) 
Date 




-4  0.31 
-3  0.70  0.02  -0.39 
-2  -0.99  -0.29  0.24  0.50  0.17  0.54 
-1  1.41  -0.71  -0.31  -0.22  -0.69  -0.15  -0.65 
0  1.52  0.45  -0.14  -0.80  -0.18  0.06  -0.66  0.00 
+1  0.25  -0.99  -0.27  -0.29  -3.23  -0.03  -0.70  -0.15 
+ 2  0.64  -0.10  -0.27  0.12  2.18  0.00  0.26  0.47 
+3  0.41  -0.07  0.08  -0.01  -0.09  0.77  -0.05  -0.37 
+4  0.43  0.77  -0.08  -0.36  0.38  -0.05  -0.85  -0.31 
+5  -0.26  0.20  -0.72  0.16  0.40  -0.16  -0.27  -0.03 
Cumulative 
change, 
peak  to quarter 
after trough  2.89  -1.25  -1.00  -1.08  -3.28  0.02  -1.74  -0.26 
Cumulative 
change, 
1 to 5 quarters 
after trough  1.21  0.80  -0.99  -0.09  2.88  0.55  -0.92  -  0.23 
Note: Data  for quarters  prior  to  the  peak  are not  reported. 22  ROMER  & ROMER 
creating  strong  recoveries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  automatic  move- 
ments  in  the  surplus  during  recessions  may  be  large  enough  and 
consistent  enough  to have  significantly  affected  the path of real output 
following  troughs. 
Despite  this negative  conclusion  on  the  overall  movement  of discre- 
tionary  fiscal  policy  during  recessions,  the  finding  that  discretionary 
fiscal policy is consistently  expansionary  around troughs is intriguing.  If 
these  expansions  are  in  fact  responses  to  economic  conditions,  they 
would  suggest  that  deliberate  fiscal  policy  may  play  some  role  in 
recoveries. More important, they raise the possibility  that if such expan- 
sions  were  only  undertaken  more  aggressively,  fiscal policy  could  be a 
significant  countercyclical  tool.  The  key  issues  are the  motives  for the 
shifts in policy,  the reasons  they  are not larger, and  the timing  of their 
effects. It is to these  issues  that we  now  turn. 
Table  4  THE  AUTOMATIC  SURPLUS  IN RECESSIONS  AND RECOVERIES 
Change  in ratio  of  automatic  surplus  to trend  GDP 
(percentage  points) 
Date 




-4  -0.46 
-3  -0.32  -0.19  -0.48 
-2  -0.35  -0.29  -0.34  -0.50  -0.50  -  0.37 
-1  -1.41  -0.59  -0.22  -0.41  -0.44  -0.18  -0.12 
0  -0.84  -1.01  -0.51  -0.41  -1.08  -0.90  -0.30  0.85 
+1  0.47  -0.15  -0.08  0.01  0.07  -0.32  -0.27  -0.85 
+2  -0.11  0.33  0.11  -0.50  0.08  0.30  -0.03  -0.62 
+3  0.72  0.50  0.17  0.35  0.12  0.13  0.40  -0.04 
+4  0.18  0.26  0.37  -0.18  0.34  -0.17  0.40  -0.06 
+ 5  0.22  0.35  0.21  -0.04  0.00  0.01  0.43  - 0.08 
Cumulative 
change, 
peak  to quarter 
after trough  -2.45  -1.76  -1.09  -1.16  -2.60  -1.22  -1.74  -0.49 
Cumulative 
change, 
1 to 5 quarters 
after trough  1.00  1.44  0.86  -0.37  0.56  0.27  1.21  -0.80 
Note: Data for quarters prior to the peak are not reported. What  Ends  Recessions?  ?  23 
3. Motivations  for Policy  Actions 
This  section  analyzes  the  nature  and  motivation  of  the  policy  actions 
behind  the  movements  in  interest  rates  and  the  high-employment 
surplus  described  in  the  previous  section.  This  analysis  is  crucially 
important  because  our  policy  indicators  could  move  for reasons  other 
than  antirecessionary  policy.  Interest  rates, for example,  could  decline 
during  recessions  if the Federal Reserve  were  targeting  money  growth 
and  simply  allowed  rates  to  fall  as  declines  in  real  activity  reduced 
money  demand.  They  could  also  fall  if  the  Federal  Reserve  were 
targeting  interest  rates but  changed  them  in response  to international 
or financial-market developments  rather than in response  to recessions. 
Similarly, the  high-employment  surplus  could  fall because  of  military 
actions  or other  spending  changes  unrelated  to  the  state of  the  econ- 
omy.  Only by analyzing  the motivations  of policymakers  can we  deter- 
mine  whether  the  movements  in  interest  rates  and  the  high-employ- 
ment  surplus  during  recessions  were  the  result of deliberate  antireces- 
sionary  policy. 
3.1 MONETARY  POLICY 
The  records  of  the  Federal  Reserve  provide  ample  evidence  that  the 
falls  in  interest  rates  before  recoveries  are  the  result  of  deliberate 
antirecessionary  policy.  Boschen  and  Mills  (1992)  provide  a  monthly 
index  of the Federal Reserve's intentions  based  on the Record of Policy 
Actions  of  the  Federal  Open  Market Committee  (FOMC). Their index 
classifies  intentions  on  a scale  from  -2  to  +2,  with  -2  indicating  a 
strong  emphasis  on  inflation  reduction  and  +2  indicating  a  strong 
emphasis on real growth. Table 5 shows  the change in the Boschen-Mills 
index  from  the  peak  in  economic  activity  to  five  quarters  after  the 
trough.  (Most of the values  are in fractions because  we  have  converted 
the  monthly  series  to quarterly values  to be  consistent  with  our other 
indicators.) 
The most obvious  message  of Table 5 is that monetary  policy typically 
changes  toward an emphasis  on real growth very soon after the peak in 
real GDP. Without  exception,  the change  in the Boschen-Mills  index  is 
positive  within  two  quarters  of  the  peak.  In  many  cases  the  change 
occurs concurrent  with  or even  slightly before the peak in output.  This 
pattern obviously  parallels the finding in Section 2 that interest rates fall 
soon  after the  peak  in  most  cases.  The behavior  of  the  Boschen-Mills 
index  indicates  that the Federal Reserve typically responds  to weakness 
in the economy  quite rapidly and that the declines  in interest  rates are 
generally  the result of deliberate monetary  policy. 24  ROMER  &  ROMER 
Table  5  THE  BOSCHEN-MILLS  INDEX  IN RECESSIONS  AND RECOVERIES 
Change  in the Boschen-Mills index 
Date 




-4  0.33 
- 3  0.67  -0.67  0.67 
-2  1.33  1.00  0.33  0.00  0.33  na 
-1  0.67  1.67  1.33  0.67  1.00  0.00  na 
0  0.00  0.67  0.33  0.33  1.67  0.00  0.00  na 
+1  0.00  0.67  0.00  0.67  0.33  0.67  1.00  na 
+ 2  -0.33  - 1.00  -0.67  0.33  0.00  0.33  0.00  na 
+3  -1.67  -1.00  -0.33  0.00  -0.67  0.00  -0.67  na 
+4  -0.67  0.00  -0.33  -1.00  -0.33  0.00  -1.33  na 
+ 5  -1.00  -0.33  -0.67  0.00  -0.33  0.00  0.00  na 
Cumulative 
change, 
peak  to quarter 
after  trough  2.67  3.00  2.67  2.00  2.67  0.67  2.00  na 
Cumulative 
change, 
1 to 5 quarters 
after trough  -3.67  -2.33  -2.00  -0.67  -1.33  0.33  -2.00  na 
Notes: Data for quarters prior to the peak are not reported. The Boschen-Mills index is not 
available for the 1991 recession. A positive change in the Boschen-Mills index indicates a move 
toward expansion; a negative change indicates a move toward contraction. 
Table 5  also  shows  that  the  emphasis  of  monetary  policy  typically 
changes  soon  after the  trough.  In every  recession  analyzed  by Boschen 
and  Mills, monetary  policy  turned  contractionary  within  two  or three 
quarters of  the  low  point  in  real output.  This again  suggests  that  the 
rises in interest rates after troughs  described  in Section 2 are the result 
of deliberate Federal Reserve policy.9 
9.  It  is  important  to  note  that  although  Boschen  and  Mills  find  that  concern  about 
inflation  became  the  main  motivational  factor  for  the  Federal  Reserve  after  each 
trough, inflation itself does  not consistently  rise in the early stages of the recoveries. To 
the extent  that there is a pattern, the inflation rate (measured  as the percentage  change 
in  the  GDP  deflator)  generally  falls during  the  first two  years  of  recoveries,  though 
most  of this effect is due  to the first quarter after the trough. What  Ends  Recessions?  .  25 
3.1.1 Episodes  The  Boschen  and  Mills index,  while  very  useful,  is not 
perfect  for  our  purposes  because  it  does  not  consider  the  Federal 
Reserve's  perceptions  of the  state of the  economy.0l  Therefore, it does 
not  distinguish  between  times when  the Federal Reserve  is counteract- 
ing a recession  and, for example,  times when  it believes  the economy  is 
growing  normally  but  desires  even  faster growth.  For this reason,  it is 
useful  to supplement  Boschen  and Mills's analysis with  an independent 
reading  of  the  Record  of  Policy  Actions  of  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee  and the  Minutes of the FOMC during  recessions.'1 
1953  The Federal Reserve was very quick to perceive  the weakening  of 
the economy  in 1953. In retrospect, we  know  that the peak in real GDP 
occurred in the second  quarter of 1953. Yet as early as the June 11, 1953, 
meeting,  one  member  of  the  FOMC expressed  the  opinion  that  "the 
economy  was  cresting" (Minutes, 6/11/53,  p. 50). Throughout  the  fall, 
the  economic  conditions  reviewed  by  the  Board  indicated  that  the 
economy  was  relatively  stable, but  with  "indications  of  reductions  in 
demand  in some important sectors" (Minutes, 9/8/53,  p. 2). By Decem- 
ber, however,  the FOMC felt that "the  decline  in economic  conditions, 
though  moderate,  was  unmistakable"  (1953, p.  102). The FOMC began 
to  loosen  policy  in  the  summer  of  1953.  The  FOMC  initially  aimed 
merely  to  end  the  previous  policy  of  monetary  contraction,  but  by 
September  1953  they  had  adopted  a  program  of  "active  ease."  The 
motivations  for  this  policy  were  summed  up  by  one  member,  who 
stated, "the System should  be trying to build factors which  would  offset 
any  down-turn  in  the  economy....  [Thus]  it  would  be  desirable  to 
pursue  a  policy  of  active  ease  by  putting  reserves  liberally  into  the 
market" (Minutes, 9/8/53,  p. 11). This switch  to antirecessionary  policy 
is  also  indicated  by  the  decision  to  remove  any  mention  of  inflation 
from the  directive,  leaving  as the  primary goal  of  open  market opera- 
tions  "avoiding  deflationary  tendencies"  (Minutes, 9/24/53,  p. 29).12 
1957  Monetary policy in 1957 was almost identical to that in 1953. Once 
again, the Federal Reserve perceived  the downturn  immediately.  While 
10.  The speed  with  which  the  Federal Reserve  recognizes  recessions  has been  analyzed 
by  other  researchers.  See,  for example,  Hinshaw  (1968), Kareken and  Solow  (1963), 
and Brunner and Meltzer (1964). 
11.  The Records of Policy Actions for each year are compiled  in the  Annual Reports of the 
Board of Governors.  Citations to this source are only  identified  by the year and page 
number.  Citations  to the  Minutes are identified  by  the  title, date,  and  page  number. 
12.  Technical  considerations  involving  seasonal  demand  for  reserves  and  Treasury  fi- 
nancing  operations  had some effect on the exact timing of the easing  over this period. 
Specifically, these  considerations  appear to have  led  the FOMC to ease  slightly  more 
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the peak in real GDP occurred in the third quarter of 1957, the records 
of the Federal Reserve show  that as of the October 1, 1957, meeting,  the 
FOMC noted  that  "an  increasing  number  of  business  observers  were 
suggesting...  that the prospective  movement  in activity was  a decline" 
(1957, p.  51). By the  November  12 meeting,  the  FOMC perceived  that 
"there  no  longer  was  much  doubt  that  at  least  a  mild  downturn  in 
business  activity  was  under  way"  (1957,  p.  56).  In  response  to  the 
decline,  on  November  12 the  FOMC changed  its  policy  directive  "to 
eliminate  the  previous  clause  (b)  which  had  called  for  restraining 
inflationary  pressures  and  to  replace  that  clause  with  wording  that 
provided  for open  market operations  with  a view...'to  fostering  sus- 
tainable  growth  in  the  economy  without  inflation  by  moderating  the 
pressures  on  bank  reserves'"  (1957,  p.  56).  The  motivation  for  this 
change  was  summed  up  by  Vice  Chairman  Hayes,  who  stated  that 
"relaxing  credit  restraint...  seems  desirable  in  view  of  the  possibility, 
however  remote, that the business  adjustment  may be more than a mild 
dip"  (Minutes,  11/12/57,  p.  18).  Thus,  monetary  policy  was  clearly 
antirecessionary  in this episode. 
1960  The  changes  in  monetary  policy  during  the  1960 recession  were 
motivated  largely  by  a belief  that  economic  activity  was  roughly  con- 
stant or increasing  slightly,  not by perceptions  that the economy  was in 
a recession.  While the peak in real GDP occurred in the first quarter of 
1960, as late  as July 1960 the  FOMC's perception  was  only  that "little 
upward  momentum  was  evident,...  and  uncertainty  regarding  future 
trends  continued  to be widespread"  (1960, p. 58). The Federal Reserve 
nevertheless  moved  to lower interest rates repeatedly  over the first nine 
months  of  the  year  in  order  to  increase  real growth.  For example,  in 
May  the  FOMC  felt  that  the  "lack  of  exuberance  in  the  business 
picture...  justified  moving  modestly  in  the  direction  of  increasing  the 
supply  of reserves  available to the banking  system" (1960, p. 53). It was 
not until November  that the FOMC realized  that a recession  was under 
way  (1960,  pp.  70-71).  By  that  time,  however,  balance  of  payments 
considerations  prevented  further easing.  Thus,  the  declines  in  interest 
rates  over  this  period  were  largely  the  result  of  shifts  in  policy  in 
response  to news  about real output, but were not truly antirecessionary. 
1969  Real output  reached  its peak  in the  fourth  quarter of  1969. Over 
the  last several  months  of  1969, the  Federal Reserve  gradually  revised 
its  forecast  of  short-run  growth  downward  to  the  point  where  its 
expectation  was  that  growth  would  be  approximately  zero  over  the 
next  several  quarters. Concern  about  the  high  level  of  inflation,  how- 
ever,  kept  the  FOMC  from  shifting  to  easier  policy  (see,  e.g.,  1970, What  Ends  Recessions?  *  27 
p.  96).  By  February  1970  the  forecast  had  been  revised  to  predict 
negative  growth;  as a result, the FOMC "concluded  that, in light of the 
latest economic  developments  and  the  current business  outlook,  it was 
appropriate  to  move  gradually  toward  somewhat  less  restraint" (1970, 
p. 103). The stance of policy  actually shifted  only  slightly  over the next 
several  months,  however.  But  beginning  in  May,  the  FOMC  moved 
consistently  toward  easier  policy.  In May  and  June,  this  shift  was  to 
some  extent  a response  to  "strains" in  financial  markets.  Throughout 
the  second  half of the year, however,  the  easing  was  a response  to the 
weak state of the economy  and a perception  that inflation was moderat- 
ing.  In  August,  for  example,  the  FOMC  felt  that  "expectations  of 
continuing  inflation had abated considerably....  It was the consensus  of 
the  Committee  that  monetary  policy  at present  should  be  sufficiently 
stimulative  to  foster  moderate  growth  in  real  economic  activity.... 
Against  this  background,  the  Committee  decided  that  open  market 
operations  should  be  directed  at promoting  some  easing  of conditions 
in credit markets" (1970, p. 149). Thus, the  falls in interest  rates during 
the  1969 recession  were  largely the result of deliberate antirecessionary 
policies. 
1973  Beginning  roughly  in  February  1974,  the  Federal  Reserve  ex- 
pected  real output  to fall in the first quarter and then  to stay essentially 
unchanged  (see,  for example,  1974, pp.  137, 144). While  this  suggests 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  was  quick  to  discern  the  onset  of  recession, 
which  we  now  date  as  having  begun  with  the  peak  in  the  fourth 
quarter of  1973, it was  slow  to realize  its severity.  It was  not  until  the 
October  14 FOMC meeting  that  the  System  acknowledged  that  there 
would  be  an  extended  decline  in  real  activity  (1974,  p.  207).  As  in 
1969-1970,  concern  about inflation  prevented  the Federal Reserve from 
loosening  significantly during the early part of the recession,  and in fact 
led  to considerable  tightening  in the  spring  of 1974 (see,  e.g.,  1974, pp. 
107, 161). Beginning  in September, however,  the FOMC began  to move 
to  ease  policy  significantly.  This  easing  was  clearly  a response  to  the 
recession;  for example,  the  summary  of actions by the Board of Gover- 
nors  in  September  through  November  states  that  "the  Board felt  that 
the weakening  tendencies  in the economy  should  be countered  initially 
through  the  use  of  monetary  policy  instruments  other  than  the  dis- 
count rate. To this end, System open  market operations became increas- 
ingly  less restrictive as the fall progressed"  (1974, pp.  109-110;  see  also 
pp.  202-203,  211, 213, 225). These  antirecessionary  policies  continued 
into  the first part of 1975 (see,  for example,  1975, pp.  142-143). 
1980  At  every  meeting  of  the  FOMC  from  July  1979  through  the 
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either under way  or was imminent.  Concern about inflation and money 
growth,  however,  prevented  policymakers  from moving  to lower  inter- 
est rates until the spring of 1980. Beginning  in April 1980, just after the 
actual peak in real GDP in the first quarter of 1980, the combination  of 
weak  money  growth  and  unfavorable  news  about  real output  caused 
the FOMC to lower  the  federal funds  rate sharply. The FOMC did not 
want  to "exacerbate recessionary  tendencies  in the economy"  and was 
concerned  about  "the  risk  that  the  contraction  would  prove  to  be 
deeper  than was  widely  expected"  (1980, pp.  117, 122). 
1981  Real GDP peaked  in the third quarter of 1981. As early as Novem- 
ber,  "the  consensus  [of  the  FOMC] was  that  the  downward  drift  in 
economic  activity  apparent  when  the  Committee  met in  early October 
had  clearly  developed  into  a  recession"  (1981,  p.  136).  The  major 
declines  in interest  rates occurred in the  fourth quarter of 1981 and  in 
the  third  and  fourth  quarters  of  1982. The  declines  in  late  1981, like 
those  in  the  spring  of  1980, were  partly  a  response  to  weak  money 
growth  and  partly a direct response  to the  recession.  By July 1982, the 
FOMC wanted  "to  provide  sufficient  monetary  growth  to  encourage 
recovery  in  economic  activity  over  the  months  ahead"  (1982, 
pp.  109-110).  FOMC  members  stressed  "the  need  for  flexibility  in 
interpreting  the  behavior  of  the  monetary  aggregates"  and  felt  that 
money  growth  "near, or for a time somewhat  above, the upper  ends  of 
[the  target] ranges  would  be  acceptable"  (1982, p.  111). Although  con- 
cern with  the growth  of monetary  aggregates  was  an important motive 
in  monetary  policy  over  this  period,  direct concern  about  real activity 
and the effects of the recession  on the financial system was important as 
well. 
1990  In the  most  recent  recession  the  Federal Reserve began  to worry 
about a downturn  long  before  it occurred. As early as December  1989, 
the  FOMC  viewed  "the  risks  of  a  shortfall  in  economic  activity  as 
sufficiently  high  to justify an immediate  move  to slightly  easier reserve 
conditions"  (1989, pp.  135-136).  In July  1990, immediately  after what 
we  now  know  was  the  peak  in  real  GDP,  the  FOMC expected  "sus- 
tained but subdued  growth  in economic  activity...  for the next  several 
quarters" (1990, p. 120). In response  they  called for "some  easing  fairly 
soon  unless  incoming  indicators  indicated  appreciably  stronger  mone- 
tary growth  and  greater inflationary  pressures  than  the  members  cur- 
rently expected"  (1990, p. 126). 
While the Federal Reserve was quick to worry about recession,  it was 
fairly slow to realize that a recession  was actually in progress during the 
fall of 1990. In October the FOMC believed  that "the  available data do What  Ends  Recessions?  ?  29 
not  point  to cumulating  weakness  and  the  onset  of a recession"  (1990, 
p. 139). They  nevertheless  felt that "an easing  move  was  warranted  in 
light  of indications  that there  was  a significant  risk of a much  weaker 
economy"  (1990, p. 141). Not  until November  did  a consensus  develop 
that "the most likely outcome  was a relatively mild and brief downturn" 
(1990, p. 148). At this point,  the FOMC voted  for some  slight immediate 
easing  of reserve conditions  and indicated  that "the  growing  signs of a 
softening  economy...  suggested  that  the  Committee  should  remain 
alert...  to  signals  that  some  further  easing  was  appropriate"  (1990, 
p. 149). Thus it appears that, although  the falls in interest rates through- 
out 1990 were  motivated  by movements  in real output,  only  those  after 
November  1990 were  truly antirecessionary. 
3.1.2 Lessons  from Postwar Monetary Policy  This analysis  of the  motiva- 
tions  for policy  suggests  that monetary  policy  can  respond  quickly  to 
changes  in economic  conditions.  The Federal Reserve has almost always 
recognized  that  a recession  was  underway  very  rapidly.  Only  in  1960 
and  1990 was  there  a lag  of more  than  one  quarter between  the  peak 
and  when  the  Federal  Reserve  perceived  a  downturn.  And  even  in 
these  two  instances,  the Federal Reserve loosened  in response  to what 
it perceived  as merely  slow  growth. 
In most  instances  the  Federal  Reserve  responded  to  the  weakening 
economy  by  increasing  reserves  immediately.  This  suggests  that  the 
declines  in  interest  rates  during  recessions  documented  in  Section  2 
were  at least  partly  the  result  of  antirecessionary  monetary  policy.  In 
those  instances  where  policymakers  did  not  cut  interest  rates  in  re- 
sponse  to the weakening  of the economy,  it was typically because  some 
other  factor, such  as inflation  or balance  of  payments  difficulties,  was 
thought  to necessitate  tight policy. 
The  fact that the  Boschen  and  Mills index  of Federal Reserve  inten- 
tions shows  a move  toward inflation control soon after the start of most 
recoveries  is  also  important.  It  suggests  that  most  periods  of  high 
inflation  are not  the  result  of antirecessionary  monetary  policy  carried 
too  far. Rather, they  are more likely  the result of expansionary  policies 
taken for reasons unrelated  to recessions  or of insufficient shifts toward 
combating  inflation  once  recoveries  have  begun.  Thus, policy  mistakes 
are not  an inherent  feature of antirecessionary  monetary  policy. 
3.2 FISCAL  POLICY 
Our primary source for the history of fiscal policy is the  Economic  Report 
of the President, published  biennially  from 1948 to 1952 and  then  annu- 
ally  from  1953  through  the  present.  The  Economic Reports contain 30  ROMER  &  ROMER 
detailed  descriptions  and  justifications  of  the  President's  fiscal policy 
recommendations.  They  also  summarize  the  fiscal policies  actually  im- 
plemented  in  the  preceding  year.  If  the  policies  implemented  differ 
from those  previously  recommended  by  the  administration,  some  dis- 
cussion  or critique of  Congress's  motives  is usually  given.  As a result, 
the  Economic  Reports provide  unique  insight  into  both  the  motivation 
for policy  and the lags in taking fiscal actions.l3 
3.2.1 Episodes 
1953  The  end  of  the  Korean  War  caused  a  substantial  decline  in 
government  spending  in  1953. When  a recession  began  in  the  second 
quarter of 1953, the Eisenhower  administration  did not take any notice- 
able steps  to increase  spending.  It did, however,  move  to reduce  taxes 
shortly before the trough of the recession  in the second  quarter of 1954. 
In January 1954 an extensive  tax cut went  into effect that reduced  taxes 
during the first six months  of 1954 by $1.1 billion, or about 0.6% of GDP 
over  this period  (1955, p.  19). This tax cut eliminated  two  wartime  tax 
increases:  the  excess  profits  tax passed  in  1950, and  the  personal  and 
corporate income  tax increases  put into place in 1951. 
Whether  this  fiscal  action  was  truly  antirecessionary  is  ambiguous 
because  the original legislation  called for the excess profits tax to expire 
on June 30, 1953, and  the personal  income  tax increase  to be rescinded 
on December  31, 1953. Three pieces  of evidence,  however,  suggest  that 
it was largely discretionary. First, the excess profits tax was extended  for 
six months  early  in  1953 at the  urging  of  President  Eisenhower,  who 
felt that a tax cut in mid-1953 would  be inflationary.  Second,  the  1953 
Economic  Report includes  among  its 1954 budget  deficit projections,  the 
situation  that  would  occur  "if  the  post-Korea  tax  increases  are  not 
allowed  to  run  off  as  provided  by  present  law"  (1953,  p.  71).  This 
suggests  that  the  Truman administration  thought  an  extension  of  the 
wartime  taxes was  a likely  outcome.  Finally, the  Eisenhower  Economic 
Report of  1954 treats the  tax decrease  as an important  antirecessionary 
act. It states: 
The Secretary  of the Treasury therefore announced in the plainest possible 
language that the Administration,  besides relinquishing  the excess-profits  tax, 
would not seek to postpone the reduction of the personal income tax, averag- 
ing approximately  10 percent, scheduled for January  1, 1954. This unequivocal 
promise of tax relief to both families and business firms  bolstered confidence at 
a time when trade and employment were slipping slightly. In coming months 
13.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all citations in this section  refer to the  Economic  Reports. What  Ends  Recessions?  *  31 
these well-timed tax reductions are likely to give substantial  support to con- 
sumer and investment markets.  (1954,  p. 52) 
Even if the  tax reduction  was  discretionary,  it is obvious  that this is an 
unusual  case.  The  president  rarely has  a  tax  cut  passed  and  waiting 
prior to the onset  of recession.  Thus, there was  more flexibility in fiscal 
policy  in 1953 than at almost any other time.14 
1957  The  1957 recession  began  in  the  third quarter of  1957. The  only 
significant  fiscal  change  that  occurred  soon  after  the  onset  of  the 
recession  was  an  acceleration  of  defense  spending.  The  Eisenhower 
administration  accelerated  the  placement  of  defense  contracts,  and  in 
January  1958  requested  supplemental  appropriations  of  $1.3  billion 
from Congress  as an advance  on 1959 spending.  Although  the adminis- 
tration stressed that national security was the main motivation  for these 
actions,  it was  quick  to  point  out  the  economic  benefits.  For example, 
the  1958 Economic  Report states, "At the  turn of the year, the  economy 
was beginning  to feel the  effects of an acceleration  of the  placement  of 
defense  contract  awards,  prompted  by  the  need  to  move  forward 
quickly  with  programs  essential  to  the  strengthening  of  the  Nation's 
defenses"  (1958, p. 8). The frequent  references  to the economic  benefits 
of  this  spending  suggests  that  at  least  some  of  the  motivation  was 
antirecessionary. 
The  1959  Economic Report indicates  that  similar  types  of  spending 
acceleration  were  undertaken  around  the  trough  in the  first quarter of 
1958.  In  March  and  April  1958,  spending  on  federal  programs  for 
building  airports,  hospitals,  and  other  public  buildings  was  moved 
forward.  In April 1958, legislation  was  passed  to increase  spending  on 
the  interstate  highway  program  (1959, pp.  41-42).  Both  of  these  mea- 
sures were  consistent  with  the  Eisenhower  philosophy  that "the  major 
emphasis  of  Federal  countercyclical  policy  should  be  placed  on  mea- 
sures that will result in prompt  action....  Though  a useful  contribution 
can  be  made  by  the  acceleration  of  public  works  projects  that  are 
already  under  way  or  are  ready  to  be  started,  little  reliance  can  be 
placed  on  large undertakings  which...  can be  put  into  operation  only 
after an extended  interval of planning"  (1959, p. 2). In addition  to these 
measures,  Congress passed,  at the administration's request, a temporary 
extension  of unemployment  benefits  in June 1958 (1959, p. 40). Several 
14.  Despite  the  reduction  in  taxes,  the  high-employment  surplus  to  GDP ratio actually 
rose slightly in 1954 because  of an even  greater reduction  in spending.  However,  since 
the  decline  in  expenditures  reflected  both  external  shocks  and  long-term  national 
security  planning,  it seems  reasonable  to view  fiscal policy  as quite  expansionary  in 
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minor spending  bills passed  in July 1958 were  also taken at least partly 
in response  to the  state of the economy  (Bartlett, 1993). 
1960  Real GDP peaked  in  the  first quarter of 1960. The  1961 Economic 
Report indicates  that no  significant  antirecessionary  fiscal actions  were 
taken  before  the  trough  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1960.  Numerous 
actions, however,  were  taken in the quarter just after the turning point 
in  GDP. The  first Kennedy  administration  Economic  Report in January 
1962 reports that "immediately  upon  taking office, the new  Administra- 
tion  moved  vigorously  to use  the  fiscal powers  of the  Federal Govern- 
ment  to help  bring about economic  recovery" (1962, p. 82). Among  the 
measures  proposed  and  quickly passed  were  an acceleration  of federal 
procurement  and tax refunds,  changes  in transfer programs that added 
$2  billion  to  transfer  payments  over  fiscal years  1961 and  1962 com- 
bined,  and  the  Temporary  Extended  Unemployment  Compensation 
Act, which  extended  coverage.l5  Despite  this flurry of activity, the total 
amount  spent  under  these  programs was  quite small. 
An investment  tax credit equal to 7% of gross investment  in deprecia- 
ble machinery  and equipment  was  also proposed  early in the Kennedy 
administration  and  was  passed  in  October  1962.  Interestingly,  this 
action  is discussed  in the  chapter  of the  Economic  Report on  policies  to 
encourage  economic  growth,  not in the chapter on  economic  recovery. 
The  1962  Report states  that  "if  faster  economic  growth  is  desired, 
revision  of  the  tax  structure  is  called  for,  to  permit  a  higher  rate  of 
investment  once  full use  of resources  is achieved"  (1962, p. 132). While 
the  Report points out that increased investment  will stimulate aggregate 
demand,  this  does  not  seem  to be  the  primary motivation  behind  the 
program.  Thus,  this  often  noted  Kennedy  fiscal  stimulus  appears  to 
have  been  primarily motivated  not by the  1960 recession,  but rather by 
supply-side  issues  related to long-term  growth. 
The motivation  for the even  more famous  1964 tax cut appears to be a 
mixture  of  concern  about  sluggish  growth  and  concern  about  incen- 
tives.  It is clear from the  1963 Economic  Report, which  contains  the  first 
discussion  of  this  proposed  tax reduction,  that  the  act was  not  some 
grossly  delayed  response  to  the  1960 recession.  The  Report states  that 
"we  approach  the  issue  of tax revision,  not  in an atmosphere  of haste 
and  panic  brought  on  by  recession  or  depression,  but  in  a period  of 
15.  Two  other  measures,  the  Area  Redevelopment  Act  enacted  in  May  1961  and  the 
Public Works Acceleration Act enacted  in September  1962, were  designed  to aid areas 
with  particularly high  and persistent  unemployment.  Whether these programs should 
be viewed  as antirecessionary  acts or general  antipoverty  measures  is unclear. How- 
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comparative  calm"  (1963,  p.  xiii).  The  Report goes  on  to  argue  that 
"Only  when  we  have  removed  the  heavy  drag our fiscal system  now 
exerts on personal  and business  purchasing  power  and on the financial 
incentives  for greater risk-taking and  personal  effort can we  expect  to 
restore the high  levels  of employment  and high  rate of growth  that we 
took  for granted  in the  first decade  after the  war" (1963, p. xv). While 
supply-side  effects  are certainly  emphasized,  there  is sufficient  discus- 
sion of underutilized  capacity and unemployment  in the  1963 and 1964 
Economic  Reports that it seems clear that the aggregate  demand  effects of 
the tax cut were  also a major factor in the proposal,  and in the ultimate 
passage  of the act in February 1964. 
1969  Real  output  peaked  in  the  third  quarter of  1969. The  1970  Eco- 
nomic Report  makes  it  clear  that  inflation  was  such  an  overriding 
concern  that the administration  resisted  efforts by Congress  to increase 
spending  or reduce  taxes. It states, "the  best  hope  of curbing inflation 
and  restricting the  rise in unemployment...  rests with  a policy  of firm 
and  persistent  restraint  on  the  expansion  in  the  demand  for  goods, 
services,  and  labor" (1970, p.  22). The  one  obviously  antirecessionary 
measure  that  was  proposed  (and  ultimately  passed  in  August  1970, 
shortly  after  the  trough  in  output)  was  the  Employment  Security 
Amendments,  which  provided  additional  unemployment  benefits  once 
the  insured  unemployment  rate  exceeded  4  % for  three  consecutive 
months. 
In 1971 the administration  sought  to run a balanced  full-employment 
budget.  The  1971  Economic Report indicates  that  the  administration 
"strongly  resisted  program  expansion  which  would  substantially  raise 
commitments  for expenditures  beyond  1970" (1971, p. 26) and  took  no 
fiscal  measures  aimed  at  stemming  the  recession.  There  were  some 
increases  in  transfer  payments  because  of  a  change  in  social  security 
benefits  and an increase in revenue-sharing  to the states, but neither  of 
these  measures  appears  to  have  been  related  to  the  state of the  econ- 
omy.  Therefore,  any  fall in  the  high-employment  surplus  in  1970 and 
1971 was  motivated  by considerations  other than the recession.16 
16.  One  ambiguity  in  the  1970  fiscal  record  concerns  the  10% income  tax  surcharge 
implemented  in  1968. This surcharge, which  was  set to expire  on June 30, 1969, was 
extended  in August  at the urging of the President to cover the last six months  of 1969. 
In December  Congress  approved  a reduction  of the surcharge to 5% and an extension 
to June 30, 1970. Given this record of extensions,  the failure to extend  the surcharge in 
mid-1970 could  be viewed  as an antirecessionary  policy.  However,  the  1970 Economic 
Report does  not  speak  of the  expiration  in this way.  It states that "the  tight expendi- 
ture  control  recommended  for the  budget  for fiscal 1971...  is  intended  to  prevent" 
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In  August  1971,  more  than  a  year  after  the  trough  in  the  second 
quarter  of  1970,  the  Nixon  administration  proposed  the  "New  Eco- 
nomic  Policy." This proposal  called  for an end  to gold  convertibility,  a 
10% surcharge  on  imports,  a wage  and  price  freeze,  and  a substantial 
fiscal expansion.  Among  the fiscal changes  that were passed by Congress 
in  1971 were  an  increase  in  the  personal  income  tax  exemption,  the 
removal  of  some  excise  taxes,  a  7% job  development  credit,  and  the 
reinstatement  of the investment  tax credit. According  to Carlson (1981), 
the  Revenue  Act of 1971 reduced  annual  tax revenues  by $8 billion,  or 
0.7% of GDP. The 1972 Economic  Report makes clear that the administra- 
tion  was  well  aware  that  the  economy  was  already  recovering  before 
the New  Economic Policy was proposed.  It states, "[The administration] 
believed  that a more rapid expansion  of the  economy  than was  gener- 
ally forecast  was  desirable  and  feasible" (1972, p. 21). Thus, the  fall in 
the high-employment  surplus in 1972 was  motivated  not by an attempt 
to end  a recession,  but by a desire for more rapid growth. 
1973  Real GDP peaked  in  the  fourth  quarter of  1973. The  immediate 
response  of  the  administration  was  to  do  nothing.  According  to  the 
1974 Economic  Report, "the  budget  proposed  by the  President...  would 
inject no  fiscal stimulus  to push  the  economy  above  its average  rate of 
expansion"  (1974, p. 29).17 By January 1975, shortly before the trough in 
real  GDP,  the  administration  perceived  that  the  economy  was  in  a 
severe  recession  and  proposed  a  one-year  tax cut  of  $16 billion.  The 
Economic  Report for this  year  refers  to  it as an  "antirecession  tax cut" 
(1975, p. 7), and it is clear that there was  no  motivation  other  than the 
recession.  The  Tax Reduction  Act of  1975 was  passed  by  Congress  in 
March 1975. The largest component  of this act was  a rebate of approxi- 
mately  10% of 1974 personal  income  taxes, which  was  paid in May and 
September  1975. The act also lowered  individual  income  taxes for 1975 
by  increasing  the  standard  deduction  and  by  granting  a $30 credit  to 
each taxpayer. The act also reduced  corporate liabilities by a substantial 
amount,  mainly  through  an increase  in the  investment  tax credit from 
7% to 10%. 
There  were  minor  spending  changes  in  1975  as  well.  The  1975 
Economic  Report states that "in response  to the  sharp rise in unemploy- 
ment  in  the  second  half  of  1974, two  new  laws  that  affect the  unem- 
ployment  insurance  program  were  enacted  in  December  1974" (1975, 
p.  120). The  Emergency  Unemployment  Compensation  Act  extended 
unemployment  insurance  by  13 weeks,  and  the  Emergency  Jobs and 
Unemployment  Assistance  Act  gave  unemployment  benefits  to  some 
17.  The  1975  Economic Report states  that  fiscal policy  in  1974 was  more  contractionary 
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uncovered  workers and provided  for a small public service employment 
program. These programs were  entirely motivated  by the recession.  The 
only  major change  in spending  that was  not unambiguously  antireces- 
sionary  was  a  7% increase  in  social  security  benefits  passed  in  April 
1974. Taken as a whole,  antirecessionary  fiscal policy  actions were  very 
large  in  1975  and  explain  most  of  the  fall  in  the  high-employment 
surplus in this year. 
The Revenue  Adjustment  Act of 1975 extended  most  of the personal 
and  corporate  tax  cuts  included  in  the  Tax  Reduction  Act  of  1975 
through  the  first six  months  of  1976. The  1977 Economic  Report states 
that "the  objective of fiscal policy in 1976 was to maintain the degree  of 
stimulus  provided  during  1975  in  order  to  keep  the  economy  on  a 
course of moderate,  sustained  expansion"  (1977, p. 69). The Tax Reform 
Act of  1976 extended  many  of the  1975 tax changes  through  1977. The 
Ford  administration  argued  in  favor  of  a  permanent  extension,  and 
even  called for larger tax cuts, on  the  grounds  that the  changes  would 
stimulate  investment  and  long-term  growth  (1977,  pp.  4-5).  Thus,  it 
appears  that  by  mid-1976  the  motivation  for  policy  had  shifted  from 
antirecessionary  considerations  to  a  desire  to  stimulate  long-run  eco- 
nomic  progress. 
According  to  the  first Carter administration  Economic  Report in Jan- 
uary 1978, the  administration  "proposed  a series of measures  intended 
to raise the rate of growth  of real output  in 1977 and 1978 to a pace that 
would  lead  to significant  reductions  in the  unemployment  rate" (1978, 
p. 50). Among  the  actions  taken  were  the  Tax Reduction  and  Simplifi- 
cation Act of 1977, which  led to net tax reductions  of roughly  $5 billion 
and $10 billion in 1977 and  1978, respectively,  largely through  increases 
in  the  personal  standard  deduction  and  an  employment  tax credit. A 
variety  of  public  works,  public  service  employment,  and  training  pro- 
grams  were  funded  by  the  Economic  Stimulus  Appropriations  Act in 
the  spring  of  1977 and  were  aimed  at stimulating  the  economy.  These 
spending  increases  amounted  to  roughly  $1  billion  in  1977  and  $7 
billion  in  1978. The motivation  for all of these  programs was  clearly to 
increase  growth  from  an  already  moderate  level.  For  example,  the 
President's  section  of  the  1978  Economic Report states,  "I have  begun 
from  the  premise  that  our  economy  is  basically  healthy"  and  "the 
American  economy  is  completing  three  years  of  recovery  from  the 
severe  recession  of 1974-75"  (1978, p. 3). 
1980  The 1980 recession  began  in the first quarter of 1980 and ended  in 
the  second.  The  Carter  administration,  apparently  chastened  by  in- 
creases in inflation  during  its first years in office, took no  expansionary 
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states,  "twice  in  the  last  decade  the  tendency  for  government  to 
stimulate  the  economy  somewhat  too  freely  during  the  recovery  from 
recession  probably played  a role in retarding the  decline  of inflation  or 
renewing  its acceleration.  That is why  I was  so insistent  that a tax cut 
designed  for quick economic  stimulus  not  be  enacted  last year" (1981, 
p.  8).  In  fact,  inflation  was  seen  as  such  an  overriding  problem  that 
Carter  proposed  tightening  fiscal  policy  in  January  1980,  when  the 
Economic  Report noted  "that  a mild  recession  is widely  forecast" (1980, 
p.  9).  The  administration  believed  that  "this  austere  budget  policy, 
accompanied  by  supportive  policies  of  monetary  restraint, is  a neces- 
sary condition  for controlling  inflation" (1980, p. 6).18 
1981  Following  a brief recovery  in late  1980 and  early  1981, the  econ- 
omy  slipped  into  another  recession  in  the  third  quarter of  1981. This 
recession  lasted  until  the  third quarter of 1982. Fiscal policy  changes  in 
the  first year  of  the  Reagan  administration  were  enormous.  The  Eco- 
nomic  Recovery  Tax Act of  1981 reduced  both  personal  and  business 
taxes  substantially.  In addition  to  the  tax reductions,  federal  spending 
rose  substantially,  mainly  because  of increases  in real national  defense 
purchases  (as measured  by the National  Income and Product Accounts) 
of 6% in 1981 and 7% in 1982. 
Despite  its name, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 appears not 
to  have  been  motivated  by  the  recession.  The  1982  Economic Report 
states that "the  major elements  of the Administration's  economic  policy 
are  designed  to  increase  long-term  growth  and  to  reduce  inflation. 
Uniformly  favorable near-term effects were  not  expected"  (1982, p. 24). 
It specifically  identifies  the  Economic  Recovery  Tax Act as one  of those 
long-term  policies,  and  the  short-term  stimulatory  effects  are  never 
mentioned  (1982, p. 44). Even  the  1984  Economic  Report only  mentions 
the aggregate  demand  effects of the tax cut in the context  of discussing 
why  the  deficit  is  not  an  immediate  danger  to  the  economy  (1984, 
p. 39). 
There is similarly little emphasis  on the short-term stimulatory effects 
of  the  increase  in  defense  expenditures.  The  1982  Economic Report 
makes  it clear that  national  security  was  the  main  motive  behind  the 
spending  program when  it states that "any  economic  effects, however, 
18.  The 1981 Economic  Report emphasizes  that the fall in the high-employment  surplus in 
1980 was  not  deliberate.  Rather, it was  due  to the  "delayed  effect on  individual  tax 
refunds  and  final settlements  from the  Revenue  Act of 1978" and "to large increases 
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must be assessed  in the context  of the overriding  need  for maintaining 
the  level  of  defense  spending  necessary  for  national  security"  (1982, 
p. 85). Furthermore, the main short-term effects that were contemplated 
were  bottlenecks  and  price increases  in industries  that supply  defense 
goods  (1982, p.  86). Thus,  it  appears  that  fiscal changes  in  1981-1982 
were  almost entirely  motivated  by factors other than the recession. 
1990  The  most  recent  recession  began  in  the  second  quarter of  1990 
and  ended  in  the  first  quarter  of  1991.  Fiscal  policy  was  essentially 
unchanged  during  the  recession.  One  explanation  for this  absence  of 
discretionary fiscal policy is that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
had  been  passed  in November  1990. Given  its stress on  "credible  and 
systematic"  policies  (1991, p. 4), the  Bush administration  did  not  want 
to change  fiscal policy  so soon  after the budget  agreement.19 The only 
significant  fiscal action  proposed  in  1991 was  a cut  in  the  tax rate on 
long-term  capital gains, and this measure  was  defeated  in Congress. 
According  to  the  1993  Economic  Report, "when  the  need  for a fiscal 
policy  that  would  provide  immediate  stimulus  became  increasingly 
clear in late 1991," the Bush administration proposed  several small fiscal 
changes  (1993, p.  51). Among  the  measures  taken  were  executive  ac- 
tions  to reduce  personal  income  tax withholding  and  to accelerate  the 
spending  of  previously  appropriated  Federal  funds.  Legislation  to  re- 
duce  the  capital  gains  tax, to  provide  for a temporary  investment  tax 
allowance,  to enhance  depreciation  for certain companies,  and  to pro- 
vide  for  a  temporary  tax  credit  for  first-time  homebuyers  was  also 
proposed.  None  of these  programs were  very large, however,  and none 
were  passed  by Congress. 
3.2.2 Lessons  from Postwar Fiscal Policy  This analysis  of the motivations 
of  policy  suggests  some  important  facts  about  postwar  fiscal  policy. 
First, there  is  abundant  evidence  that  limited  fiscal  stimulus  can  be 
undertaken  rapidly.20 Either  slightly  before  or  concurrent  with  most 
troughs,  there were  small increases  in government  spending  that were 
motivated  almost  entirely  by  the  state  of  the  economy.  This  suggests 
19.  The  1993  Economic Report states  that  "the  Budget  Enforcement  Act  of  1990,  the 
ongoing  defense  downsizing,  and  a political  stalemate  between  the  Administration 
and  the  Congress  played  important  roles  in  keeping  fiscal policy  from being  more 
stimulative"  (1993, pp. 55-56). 
20.  Bartlett (1993) reaches a more pessimistic  conclusion  about the speed  with which  even 
small fiscal actions can be taken. This difference  is attributable mainly  to the fact that 
Bartlett concentrates  on  public works  programs, rather than on  all spending  and  tax 
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that  the  small  falls  in  the  high-employment  surplus  to  GDP  ratio 
around  troughs  documented  in  Section  2  were  mainly  the  result  of 
antirecessionary  policy. 
The  nature  of  these  rapid  spending  changes,  however,  provides 
insight  into  why  the  changes  were  almost  always  quite  small.  The 
spending  increases  have  typically  been  limited  to  actions  that  can  be 
taken  without  congressional  approval,  such  as  the  acceleration  of 
planned  spending  or tax refunds,  or to actions  for which  congressional 
approval  is  easy  to  obtain,  such  as  the  extension  or  expansion  of 
unemployment  insurance  benefits.  Since the  number  of such  actions  is 
inherently  limited by the  structure of the U.S. government,  it would  be 
unrealistic  to  infer  from  the  modest  increases  in  spending  around 
postwar  troughs  that equally rapid but more aggressive  fiscal responses 
were  possible. 
The  postwar  record  on  major  legislated  antirecessionary  actions  is 
complicated.  There are no examples  of major spending  changes  under- 
taken  in  response  to  recessions.  There  are, however,  two  times  when 
taxes  were  cut  in  response  to  recessions:  1953 and  1975. (Taxes were 
also cut during  the 1981 recession, but there is no evidence  that this cut 
was  motivated  by  the  cyclical condition  of the  economy.)  But both  tax 
cuts  were  unusual  in  ways  that  may  limit  their  relevance  to  other 
recessions.  In  1953,  the  tax  cut  had  already  been  passed  before  the 
recession  began;  all  Eisenhower  had  to  do  was  not  ask  that  it  be 
delayed.  In  1975,  the  recession  was  particularly  long;  it  had  already 
been  going  on  for over  a year  before  any  policy  action  was  taken.  A 
more positive  interpretation  of the  1975 experience,  however,  is that in 
response  to  a  particularly  severe  recession,  effective  measures  can 
eventually  be  taken.  Consistent  with  this positive  interpretation  is the 
fact that the  lag between  when  the tax cut was  officially proposed  and 
when  the first rebate actually appeared  was  only  five months. 
Perhaps the most important lesson  to be learned  from this analysis is 
that  most  large  fiscal  actions  have  been  taken  in  response  to  slow 
recoveries  rather  than  to  actual  recessions.  The  1964 tax  cut,  Nixon's 
"New  Economic  Policy,"  and  Carter's tax cut  and  spending  increases 
were  all passed  to increase  growth  in  a sluggish  but  basically  healthy 
economy.  This fact is  significant  because  the  potential  for policy  mis- 
takes,  for overheating  the  economy  and  generating  inflation,  is much 
higher  for such policies  than for those  passed  in the depth  of recession. 
Finally, the  record of the  specific actions  taken  in response  to reces- 
sions  suggests  that focusing  on  the  high-employment  surplus  is likely 
to  lead,  if anything,  to  overestimates  of  the  extent  of antirecessionary What  Ends  Recessions?  ?  39 
fiscal stimulus. Most of the actions took the form of temporary tax cuts, 
temporary  changes  in transfers, and changes  in the timing  of disburse- 
ments,  all  of  which  may  have  much  smaller  effects  than  long-lasting 
changes  in purchases  or taxes. 
4.  The  Contribution  of Macroeconomic  Policies 
to Recoveries 
As Sichel (1992) and Beaudry and Koop (1993) document,  recessions  are 
typically  followed  by  periods  of  very  rapid  growth.  For  the  eight 
recessions  since  1950, real growth  in the  four quarters after the  trough 
has  averaged  4.6%, and  has  exceeded  the  average  annual  postwar 
growth  rate of 2.75% in every recovery  except the current one.21 In this 
section we attempt to measure the contribution of policy to this spurt of 
rapid  growth  following  troughs.  In particular, we  ask whether  in  the 
absence  of  policy  actions,  output  growth  after  troughs  would  have 
continued  to be  negative,  been  equal  to  its average  postwar  value,  or 
been  even  higher  than it actually was. 
To measure  the role of policy, it is clearly not enough  to just establish 
how  monetary  and fiscal policy changed  during recessions  and recover- 
ies; we  also need  estimates  of the magnitude  and timing of the policies' 
effects.  Therefore,  in  this  section  we  construct  such  estimates  and 
analyze  their implications.  We do not attempt to shed  new  light on the 
underlying  question  of  whether  monetary  and  fiscal policy  have  real 
effects.  For this  exercise  we  take it as given  that policy  affects output, 
and seek to provide  plausible  estimates  of the  size of those  effects. 
4.1 ESTIMATING  THE  EFFECTS  OF POLICY 
4.1.1 Baseline  Policies  Any description  of how  policies  have  affected the 
course  of  the  economy  must  compare  the  economy's  actual behavior 
with  how  it would  have behaved  if policies  had followed  some baseline 
paths.  Thus, the  analysis  requires  specifying  baseline  policies.  We take 
as our baselines  a constant  real federal  funds  rate and  a constant  ratio 
of the high-employment  surplus to trend GDP. Thus, we are attempting 
to  estimate  the  contributions  of  changes  in  the  real funds  rate and  in 
the  ratio of the  high-employment  surplus  to trend  GDP to the  path  of 
real output. 
21.  We  calculate  average  growth  over  the  period  1953:2 to  1993:2, which  is the  sample 
period  used  in  our  subsequent  calculations.  Throughout,  percentage  changes  are 
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These  baseline  policies  are  approximately  feasible.  Unpredictable 
movements  in expected  inflation, and in receipts and expenditures  for a 
given  level  of activity, make it impossible  for policymakers  to keep  the 
real funds  rate and  the  high-employment  surplus  to  trend  GDP ratio 
exactly constant.  On a quarterly basis, however,  these  shocks  are likely 
to be  small. This would  not  be  true of  some  other  potential  baselines; 
quarterly shocks to the money  supply  and to the unadjusted  deficit, for 
example,  appear to be large. 
Over the longer term, there is no reason that fiscal policy cannot keep 
the  high-employments  surplus  to  trend  GDP  ratio  roughly  constant. 
Monetary  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  keep  the  real interest  rate 
above  or  below  its  long-term  equilibrium  level  indefinitely  without 
causing  unbounded  deflation  or inflation.  But movements  in  the  sus- 
tainable  level  of  the  real  interest  rate  are likely  to  be  gradual.  Thus, 
attributing  movements  in  the  real interest  rate that  are in  fact due  to 
changes  in its sustainable  level  to changes  in monetary  policy  will  not 
have  a large  effect  on  the  analysis  of  the  sources  of  short-run  output 
movements.22 
4.1.2 Approaches  to Estimating the Effects  of Policy  We estimate the effects 
of  monetary  and  fiscal policy  in  three  ways.  The  first two  approaches 
are  based  on  simple  regressions,  and  the  third  is  based  on  a  large 
macroeconomic  model. 
Our first regression  is an  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) regression  of 
real GDP growth  on eight  lags of the change  in our estimate  of the real 
federal  funds  rate and  on  the  current and  eight  lags  of the  change  in 
the high-employment  surplus to GDP ratio. We also include  a constant, 
a dummy  variable for the  post-1973  period  (to account  for the produc- 
tivity growth  slowdown),  and eight  lags of the dependent  variable.23 
The OLS estimates  are likely to provide  conservative  estimates  of the 
effects  of  changes  in  the  real  interest  rate.  Most  importantly,  if  the 
Federal Reserve changes  the real funds  rate on the basis of information 
about future output movements  beyond  that contained  in the right-hand 
22.  This  would  not  be  true  if  we  took  a  constant  nominal  funds  rate  as  our  baseline. 
Attempting  to peg  the nominal  rate at an unsustainable  level  would  lead to accelerat- 
ing  changes  in inflation,  the  real rate, and  output.  Thus, the  effect of changes  in the 
nominal  rate is explosive.  As a result, attributing shifts in the nominal  rate that are in 
fact due  to changes  in its sustainable level  to changes  in monetary  policy would  have 
very  large effects on the analysis  of the sources  of output  movements. 
23.  We exclude  the current value  of the change  in the real funds rate on the grounds  that 
the  real rate is likely  to respond  to output  movements  within  the  quarter. Since  this 
appears  less  likely  with  the  high-employment  surplus  to  GDP ratio, we  include  the 
contemporaneous  value  of that variable. Treating the  two  policy  variables symmetri- 
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side  variables  of  the  regression,  the  changes  in  the  real  rate  will  be 
positively  correlated with  the error term. As a result, the OLS estimates 
will  be  biased  upward  (that  is,  toward  zero).  Since,  as  Section  3  de- 
scribes, monetary  policy  responds  very  rapidly  to  economic  develop- 
ments,  this  effect is likely  be  to  present  to  some  extent.  Similarly, any 
additional  information  that consumers  have  about future output  move- 
ments  will  cause  the  real rate to rise before  increases  in  output,  again 
biasing  the  OLS  estimates  of  the  effects  of  changes  in  the  real  rate 
toward  zero. 
Contemporaneous  interaction  between  changes  in  the  real rate and 
output  growth  has  more  complex  effects  on  the  OLS estimates.  Since 
simple  examples  suggest  that such  interaction  is likely  also to bias the 
estimates  toward  zero,  and  since  the  reaction  of  output  to  the  real 
interest  rate within  the  quarter is likely  to be  small in  any  event,  this 
effect is unlikely  to reverse  the effects of the other biases.24 
Thus,  the  OLS estimates  seem  much  more  likely  to  understate  than 
overstate  the  effects  of  changes  in  the  real funds  rate. Since  there  are 
important  sources  of  variation  in  real  interest  rates,  such  as  concern 
about  inflation  and  political  considerations,  that  are  not  likely  to  be 
substantially correlated with  sources of output  movements  not included 
in  the  regression,  the  bias  may  not  be  serious.  And  for  fiscal  policy, 
where  major policy  shifts appear  to require at least several  quarters to 
implement,  and where  there are many important sources of variation in 
policy  other  than  economic  conditions,  significant  correlation  with  the 
error term appears  unlikely.  Thus, for fiscal policy  the bias from using 
OLS is likely to be small. 
Because  of the potential  bias of the  OLS estimates,  our second  set of 
estimates of policies' effects are derived  from instrumental  variables (IV) 
estimation  of the regression  just described, with  the changes  in the real 
rate treated as endogenous.  As instruments,  we  employ  the Romer and 
Romer  (1989,  1994) and  Boschen  and  Mills  (1992)  indexes  of  Federal 
Reserve policy.  We use  16 lags both  of the Romer-Romer  index  and of 
the change  in the Boschen-Mills  index. 
The Romer-Romer  index is a simple dummy  variable equal to one on 
dates  of apparent  shifts by the  Federal Reserve  to policies  designed  to 
24.  Suppose  the  true  model  is  Ayt =  aoArt + alArt-1  +  bAyt-1  +  E,  Art =  aooAyt  + 
OalAyt_1 +  PArt_1 +  Et,  where  the  E's are independent  white-noise  shocks, a0 and  a1 
are negative,  a0  is positive,  b is positive  (reflecting  the  positive  serial correlation  of 
output  growth),  and  f3  is negative  (reflecting the negative  serial correlation of changes 
in the real interest rate). For this case, one can show  that the true effect of a change  in 
Ar on output  growth  in the subsequent  period is larger (in absolute value)  than what 
one  would  obtain from an OLS regression  of  Ayt on  Art_1 and  AYt_i. 42  ROMER  &  ROMER 
reduce  inflation  from  its  current  level.  Because  these  policy  shifts  to 
combat inflation appear to be largely the result of changes  in tastes, and 
not  responses  to  additional  information  about  future  output  move- 
ments,  the index  should  be essentially  uncorrelated  with  the error term 
of the  regression.  Thus, the  Romer and  Romer dates  should  allow  the 
IV regression  to estimate the output  effects of interest rate changes.  The 
Boschen-Mills  index described in the previous section is a less-than-ideal 
instrument  because  Boschen  and  Mills do  not  distinguish  Federal  Re- 
serve  actions  that are independent  of the  economy  from those  that are 
responses  to  the  predicted  behavior  of  the  economy.  However,  if one 
believes  that most  changes  in  stated  Federal  Reserve  intentions  repre- 
sent independent  policy shifts, then this index is a useful  instrument  for 
isolating  the effects of policy-generated  changes  in interest rates. 
Both the OLS and IV regressions  are estimated  over the period  1957:2 
to  1988:4;  the  sample  period  is  dictated  by  the  availability  of  the 
Boschen-Mills  index. To drive policy multipliers from these regressions, 
we  use  the coefficient  estimates  to calculate the dynamic  multipliers  for 
a one-percentage-point  fall in the real federal funds  rate and a one-per- 
centage-point  fall in the high-employment  surplus to GDP ratio. 
Our  third  set  of  estimates  of  policies'  effects  are  from  the  Data 
Resources Incorporated (DRI) model  of the U.S. economy.  Using  a large 
macroeconomic  model  has  the  advantage  that  it incorporates  a  great 
deal  of information  and judgment.  It has  the  disadvantages,  however, 
that  it  is  much  less  transparent  than  the  regressions  and  that  its 
implications  may  reflect the  model  builders'  priors rather than  charac- 
teristics of the data. For monetary  policy, the experiment  we  consider in 
the  model  is  a  permanent  one-percentage-point  change  in  the  real 
federal  funds  rate  with  the  parameters  governing  fiscal  policy  held 
fixed.  For fiscal policy,  we  consider  a  permanent  change  in  personal 
income  taxes of 1% of GDP with  the real funds  rate held  fixed.25 
4.1.3 Results  Figure  3 shows  the  multipliers  for monetary  policy  im- 
plied by the two regressions  and by the DRI model.  The OLS regression 
implies  that  a  permanent  one-percentage-point  fall  in  the  real  funds 
rate  raises  real  GDP by  1.7%. Most  of  this  effect  comes  between  the 
second  and fifth quarters after the increase. As one would  expect, the IV 
regression  implies a somewhat  larger impact. The overall effect is now  a 
25.  For fiscal policy,  we  also investigated  averaging  the multipliers  for a change  in taxes 
with  those  for  a  change  in  government  purchases.  This  resulted  in  a  considerably 
larger  effect  in  the  quarter  of  the  policy  change  and  had  little  effect  thereafter. 
Because  most  major postwar  antirecessionary  fiscal actions  have  taken  the  form  of 
changes  in taxes and transfers, we  focus on the multipliers  for a change  in taxes. What Ends Recessions?  *  43 
Figure 3  MULTIPLIERS  FOR MONETARY POLICY 
a.  OLS Regression 
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rise in real GDP of 3.6%; the  timing  is similar to that with  OLS.26 The 
DRI model  implies  a rise in  real GDP of  1.1%, with  most  of the  effect 
26.  We  also  estimated  the  IV multipliers  using  as  instruments  only  the  Romer-Romer 
index  and  the  exogenous  right-hand-side  variables.  The  results  are  very  similar  to 
those shown  in Figure 3. The implied  multiplier for a one-percentage-point  rise in the 
real  federal  funds  rate  reaches  a  maximum  impact  on  real  GDP  of  4.3% after  12 
quarters; the timing is the same as that for the OLS and basic IV regressions.  Because 
the  Romer-Romer  index  is a dummy  equal  to one  on  only  a small number  of dates, 
the  point  estimates  for  the  limited  IV regression  are substantially  less  precise  than 
those  from the standard version. 
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coming  between  one  and four quarters after the  change. 
Figure  4  shows  the  estimated  multipliers  for fiscal policy.  The  OLS 
regression  implies  that a permanent  fall of one  percentage  point  in the 
ratio  of  the  high-employment  surplus  to  trend  GDP  raises  output  by 
1.1%. The  effect  occurs  gradually  over  about  10 quarters. The  IV esti- 
mates  imply  that  the  effects  of  lowering  the  surplus  to  GDP ratio are 
small and irregular. Taken literally, the estimates imply that fiscal policy 
has  essentially  no  effects.  However,  because  the  standard  errors  are 
Figure 4 MULTIPLIERS  FOR  FISCAL  POLICY 
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large,  the  IV  regression  does  not  provide  strong  evidence  against 
conventional  views  of the  effects of fiscal policy.  For example,  the  two 
standard error confidence  interval for the sum of the coefficients on the 
surplus to GDP ratio is (-1.59,  1.70); for comparison,  the OLS estimate 
is  -0.74.  We  therefore,  do  not  place  great  emphasis  on  the  point 
estimates  of  the  effects  of fiscal policy  from the  IV regression.  Finally, 
the DRI model  implies that the effect of a fall of one percentage  point in 
the surplus  to GDP ratio on real GDP peaks  after four quarters at 1.4% 
and then  gradually  declines. 
4.2 IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  SOURCE  OF RECOVERIES 
Table 6 summarizes  the  implications  of  these  estimated  multipliers  for 
the sources of output  growth  in the four quarters after troughs.  Specif- 
ically,  for  each  of  the  three  sets  of  multipliers,  Table  6  reports  the 
implied  average  contributions  during  these  periods  of macroeconomic 
policies  and  other  factors.  The  policy  contributions  are  divided  both 
according  to whether  they  reflect monetary  or fiscal policy  and accord- 
ing  to  whether  they  reflect actions  before  the  peaks  in real output  or 
after. In addition,  the  contributions  of fiscal policy  are divided  into  the 
effects of automatic  and discretionary  policy.  The reason for separating 
the  effects  of  prepeak  and  postpeak  policies  is  that  the  multipliers 
suggest  that  the  lags  in  the  effects  of  monetary  policy  are sufficiently 
long  that the shifts to tighter monetary  policy before peaks continue  to 
depress  growth  even  after troughs.  Thus, what  we  need  to understand 
is  not  simply  why  output  growth  is  above  normal  in  recoveries,  but 
why  it is above  normal despite  the previous  monetary  tightenings. 
Table  6  ESTIMATES  OF THE  CONTRIBUTIONS  OF MONETARY  AND FISCAL 
POLICIES  TO GROWTH  IN THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF RECOVERIES 
Contribution  to growth (percentage  points) 
Prepeak  policies  Postpeak  policies  Residual 
Source  of 
multipliers  Discretionary  Automatic  Discretionary  Automatic 
Monetary  fiscal  fiscal  Monetary  fiscal  fiscal 
OLS  -0.92  -0.18  -0.01  1.59  0.25  0.63  0.45 
IV  -2.05  0.00  -  0.03  3.00  0.02  -  0.41  1.30 
DRI  -0.14  0.27  0.14  1.48  0.50  0.85  -1.30 
Notes: The residual shows the component of the difference between mean growth in the year after 
troughs and average annual growth that is not accounted for by prepeak and postpeak policies. 
The difference between mean growth after troughs and average annual growth is 1.82 percentage 
points; the rows may not add to this value due to rounding. 46  ROMER  & ROMER 
All three  sets  of  estimates  imply  that  the  reductions  in  real interest 
rates  after peaks  are crucial to  recoveries.  The  OLS multipliers  imply 
that these  reductions  have added  an average of 1.6 percentage  points  to 
real growth  during  the  first year of recoveries,  the IV multipliers  imply 
that  they  have  added  3.0 percentage  points,  and  the  DRI multipliers 
imply  that they  have  added  1.5 percentage  points.  Thus, the  estimates 
imply  that  the  declines  in  real  interest  rates  in  recessions  are  large 
enough,  and their effects occur quickly enough,  that they play a critical 
role in the rapid growth  during recoveries. Since average output  growth 
in  the  year  following  troughs  is  4.6%, the  OLS estimates  imply  that 
without  these  declines,  growth  in the year after troughs  would  average 
only  3.0%; the IV estimates  imply  that it would  average just 1.6%; and 
the DRI estimates  imply  it would  average  only  3.1%.27 
The OLS and DRI estimates imply that discretionary fiscal expansions 
after peaks  contribute  moderately  to  growth  (not  surprisingly,  the  IV 
estimates imply  that the effect is negligible).  In both cases, however,  the 
majority  of  the  estimated  effect  comes  from  the  recovery  from  the 
1973-1975  recession.  In addition,  because  the  changes  in  discretionary 
fiscal policy  in  recessions  have  consisted  disproportionately  of  tempo- 
rary changes  in  taxes  and  transfers, the  multipliers  are likely  to  over- 
state their effects. Thus, discretionary  fiscal policy  has played  at most  a 
small role in recoveries. 
Our estimates  imply  that automatic  changes  in fiscal policy  are more 
important.  As  described  in  Section  2,  there  are  consistent  and  sub- 
stantial  changes  in  the  automatic  component  of  the  surplus  during 
recessions.  As  a  result,  the  OLS estimates  suggest  that  the  automatic 
movements  in fiscal policy  after peaks add an average of 0.6 percentage 
points  to  growth  in  the  first year  of  recoveries,  and  the  DRI model 
suggests  that they  add 0.9 percentage  points. 
27. Our calculations  assume that the changes in the real funds rate resulting from the 
Federal Reserve's consistent responses to recessions have the same real effects as 
other movements in the real funds rate. This appears  to be a reasonable  approxima- 
tion, for two reasons. First, since the Federal Reserve adjusts the real funds rate 
rapidly  to economic developments,  both the recession-related  and the remaining  part 
of movements in the real funds rate have a large unanticipated  component to them. 
Second, for the real interest rate (in contrast  to the money supply), there is no clear 
reason for unanticipated  and anticipated  changes to have very different effects. As 
described in Section 2, the fact that systematic Federal Reserve policy affects the 
nominal funds rate, together with the fact that the direction of the effect is that 
expansionary  policy lowers the nominal rate, strongly suggests that the systematic 
component of policy affects  the real rate as well. It is possible,  of course, that a larger 
movement in the money supply is needed to bring about a given change in the real 
funds rate when the movement is the result of systematic policy; but this is not 
relevant  to our calculations. What Ends Recessions?  *  47 
Together,  these  results  imply  that policies  undertaken  during  reces- 
sions  are crucial to strong recoveries.  All three sets of estimates  suggest 
that without  these  policies,  growth  during  the  first year  of  recoveries 
would  be  anemic.  The  OLS estimates  imply  that  it would  have  aver- 
aged  2.1%, the  IV estimates  imply  2.0%, and  the  DRI estimates  imply 
1.4%. Our results suggest  that the main source of the weak  growth  that 
would  occur without  the  postpeak  changes  in  policy  is  the  monetary 
tightening  that usually  occurs before peaks. The first column  of Table 6 
suggests  that prepeak monetary  policy  reduces  growth  in the year after 
troughs  by roughly  1 percentage  points. 
Nonpolicy  factors appear  to have  little  effect on  growth  in  the  year 
following  troughs.  The  final column  of  Table 6 shows  the  amount  of 
above-average  growth  not  accounted  for by prepeak  or postpeak  poli- 
cies. While this residual varies somewhat  depending  on the multipliers 
used,  it  is  typically  small,  implying  that  growth  would  have  been 
approximately  average during the first year of recoveries  in the absence 
of  policy  changes.  Thus,  nothing  in  our  analysis  suggests  that  output 
would  continue  to  drop  indefinitely  without  governmental  interven- 
tion.  Similarly,  nothing  suggests  that  the  economy  possesses  strong 
self-correction  mechanisms  that would  cause  it to quickly make up  the 
output  losses  that occur during  recessions. 
Considering  slightly  longer  horizons  strengthens  the case that mone- 
tary policy  is critical to recoveries.  For example,  output  growth  (at an 
annual  rate) in the  fifth and  sixth quarters of recoveries  averages  only 
0.1 percentage  points  above normal; but the OLS multipliers  imply that 
postpeak  monetary  policies  contribute  1.4 percentage  points  to annual 
growth  in these  quarters, the  IV multipliers  imply  that they  contribute 
3.1  percentage  points,  and  the  DRI multipliers  imply  that  they  con- 
tribute 0.2 percentage  points.28 
28.  We  also  investigated  the  implications  of  using  multipliers  from  the  MPS  model 
maintained  by the Federal Reserve  Board. The MPS model  implies  very  gradual, but 
very persistent, effects of monetary  policy on real output.  This response  occurs mainly 
because  the  nominal  long-term  rate is  assumed  to  adjust  gradually  to  the  nominal 
short-term rate. This gradual  adjustment  causes  the  real long-term  rate to fall essen- 
tially linearly  in response  to a permanent  change  in  the  real funds  rate. As a result, 
the  change  in  the  funds  rate has  very  little  effect  on  output  in  the  first year  and  a 
nearly permanent  effect on output  growth thereafter. Therefore, the model  suggests  a 
very different view  of the source of recoveries  than any of the estimates considered  in 
the  text.  The  MPS multipliers,  like  the  OLS and  DRI ones,  imply  that  fiscal policy 
contributes  moderately.  But the  extreme  lags in the  effects of monetary  policy  in the 
model  mean  that the monetary  expansions  undertaken  during  recessions  have  only  a 
modest  effect  on  growth  during  the  first year  of  recoveries.  As  a result,  the  model 
implies  that nonpolicy  factors are the critical source of recoveries. 48  ROMER  &  ROMER 
4.3 IMPLICATIONS  OF AN ALTERNATIVE  BASELINE 
The  preceding  analysis  takes  a constant  real federal  funds  rate as the 
baseline  monetary  policy  and,  therefore,  describes  output  movements 
resulting  from changes  in the real funds  rate as being  due  to monetary 
policy. But there are other possible baselines.  In a conventional  textbook 
model  where  the  Federal  Reserve  is  targeting  the  growth  rate of  the 
money  supply,  nominal  interest  rates  would  decline  in  a  recession 
because  of  the  fall in  income  and  because  of  the  increase  in  the  real 
money  supply  resulting  from  the  fall  in  inflation.  The  effect  on  real 
interest  rates would  be mitigated,  however,  by the  decline  in expected 
inflation. 
The magnitude  of these  effects  depends  on  the  interest  and  income 
elasticities  of money  demand.  Following  the  standard  approach  in the 
money  demand  literature, assume  that money  demand  takes the  form 
In mt = a +  b In y  -  c In  i  +  -  d't  +  K  In mr_l,  (1) 
where  mt is real money  balances,  Yt is real income,  it  is the  nominal 
interest  rate, and  trr is  quarterly inflation.  Equation  (1) implies  that  a 
decline  in  y  with  m  held  fixed  reduces  In i  by  (b/c)Alny  and, 
therefore,  reduces  i  by  approximately  (b/c)[A  ln y]i.  Similarly, it  im- 
plies  that  a fall in  the  price level  with  the  nominal  money  stock  held 
fixed  reduces  i  by  approximately  (l/c)(1  -  dXA In p]i  in  the  initial 
period  and  [(1 -  X)/c][A  In p]i  in  subsequent  periods.  Goldfeld  and 
Sichel (1990), Judd and Scadding  (1982), and others suggest  that reason- 
able  values  of  the  parameters  in  Equation  (1)  are  b =  0.12,  c =  0.05, 
d =  0.7, and  A =  0.8. These  values  imply  long-run  income  and  interest 
elasticities  of 0.60 and  -0.25,  respectively. 
To estimate  the  effect of the recession  on interest  rates when  money 
growth  is held  fixed,  we  need  measures  of  the  falls in  output,  prices, 
and  expected  inflation  due  to  the  recession.  We  compute  the  fall  in 
output  between  the  peak  and  the  quarter following  the  trough  due  to 
the  recession  (the  A In y  term  in  the  expression  above)  simply  as the 
sum of the  shortfalls of quarterly output  growth  from its average  value 
of  2.75%/4,  or 0.69%. These  values  of  the  change  in  y,  together  with 
the  estimates  of  b and  c and  the  actual values  of the  nominal  interest 
rate, imply  that  if the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  adjust  the  path  of  the 
money  stock, the falls in real income  would  reduce the nominal  interest 
rate by  an  average  of  0.9 percentage  points  over  the  period  from  the 
peak  to one  quarter after the  trough. 
To find the effect of the recession  on the price level,  we  compare  the 
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inflation  had  simply  held  steady  at  the  value  of  expected  inflation 
implied  by our estimated  real federal funds  rate as of the peak quarter. 
These  estimates  imply  that  the  increases  in  the  real  money  supply 
coming  from the  declines  in inflation  reduce  the  nominal  interest  rate 
by  an average  of 0.6 percentage  points.  Thus, the  textbook  self-correc- 
tion mechanism  of downward  pressure on prices increasing real money 
balances and, therefore, lowering  interest rates accounts for only a small 
part of the interest rate declines  during  recessions.29 
Finally, the  estimates  of expected  inflation  implied  by our real funds 
rate series suggest  that expected  inflation  declines  by an average  of 1.4 
percentage  points  between  the  peak  and  the  quarter after the  trough. 
The fact that the direct effects of the declines  in expected  inflation more 
than offset the effects of the increases in the real money  stock resulting 
from  the  falls in  inflation  is  consistent  with  the  evidence  of  De  Long 
and  Summers  (1986) that price flexibility is on  net  destabilizing  in the 
U.S. economy. 
Combining  these  three figures, our results suggest  that if the Federal 
Reserve  were  holding  money  growth  fixed,  the  behavior  of  income, 
prices, and  expected  inflation  would  lead  to only  moderate  falls in the 
nominal  interest rate between  the peak and the quarter after the trough 
and have  essentially  no effect on the real interest rate. Thus, choosing  a 
baseline  for monetary  policy  that takes account  of  these  effects would 
not affect our conclusion  that monetary  policy  is the primary engine  of 
recovery  from recessions.30 
5. Stabilization  and Persistence 
Our  analysis  of  the  contribution  of  macroeconomic  policy  to  output 
growth  can be used  to address  two  other issues.  First, we  can examine 
the  overall  role  of  macroeconomic  policy  in  economic  stabilization. 
Even  if policy  has  contributed  to recoveries,  it is useful  to consider  its 
29.  An alternative  way  of computing  the effect of the recession  on the price level  would 
be  to  combine  the  figures  for the  decline  in  output  with  standard  estimates  of  the 
Phillips curve (for example,  Gordon,  1990). Doing  this yields  a slightly  larger implied 
reduction  in nominal  interest  rates. 
30.  By  describing  any  changes  in  the  real interest  rate  that  are  not  due  to  changes  in 
income,  prices,  and  expected  inflation  as  changes  in  monetary  policy,  the  baseline 
policy  implicit  here  is money  targeting  that  accommodates  any  shifts  in  the  money 
demand  function.  A natural alternative  choice  of the baseline  would  be pure  money 
targeting.  We  do  not  pursue  this  possibility  for two  reasons.  First, there  have  been 
large  shifts  in  money  demand,  most  of  which  were  largely  accommodated  by  the 
Federal  Reserve.  Second,  the  results  are likely  to be  sensitive  to  the  specification  of 
what  it  means  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  continue  with  "normal"  money  growth 
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effects in other periods.  Second,  we  can investigate  the extent  to which 
the  persistence  of  overall  output  movements  derives  from  the  persis- 
tence  of policy  changes  and their effects. 
5.1 THE  OVERALL  RECORD  OF STABILIZATION  POLICY 
Our  estimates  of  the  contributions  of  policy  to  output  growth  can be 
used  to construct estimates  of what  the path of real output  would  have 
been  if policy  had held  the real interest  rate and the high-employment 
surplus to GDP ratio constant.  Figure 5 shows  the implied  paths of real 
Figure 5 OVERALL  EFFECTS  OF ACTIVE  POLICY 
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Figure 5 (continued) 
c. Multipliers  from  DRI  Model 
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output  under  policies  of a constant  high-employment  surplus  to  GDP 
ratio and  a constant  real funds  rate, together  with  its actual path,  for 
the three sets of multipliers. Since, as described earlier, monetary  policy 
cannot  in fact hold  the  real rate constant  indefinitely,  no  great signifi- 
cance  should  be  attached  to  the  longer-term  movements  in  the  differ- 
ence between  the implied  and actual paths. But the shorter-term swings 
can be interpreted  as largely representing  the effects of policy. 
The OLS multipliers  suggest  that departures  from the  baseline  poli- 
cies  have  generally  made  recessions  more  severe,  and  recoveries  more 
rapid, than  they  otherwise  would  have  been.  The estimates  imply,  for 
example,  that the  1960 and  1969 recessions  would  not have  occurred at 
all under  the baseline  policies,  and that the output  declines  in the 1973 
and  1981  recessions  would  have  been  half  as  large  as  they  actually 
were.  These  estimates  suggest  that  the  one  major  success  of  active 
policy  occurred  in  the  last  few  years:  Since  growth  has  been  weak 
despite  a falling  real funds  rate, the  estimates  imply  that  there  would 
have been a protracted and severe recession  under the baseline  policies. 
The  IV multipliers  suggest  a  generally  similar picture.  They  imply, 
however,  that  in  addition  to  preventing  a  major downturn  over  the 
past  few  years,  active  policy  prevented  extended  periods  of  approxi- 
mately zero growth  in the mid-1950s, mid-1970s, and mid-1980s. Finally, 
the  DRI multipliers  imply  that the  1953 and  1960 recessions  would  not 
have  occurred  under  the  baseline  policies,  that  the  1969  and  1973 
recessions  would  have  occurred  later  and  been  slightly  more  severe, 52- ROMER  & ROMER 
and  again  that  the  1990 recession  would  have  been  much  longer  and 
larger. 
This overall  record  of  stabilization  policy  suggests  that  policy,  espe- 
cially monetary  policy, helped  to both start and stop postwar recessions. 
Since both inflation control and output  growth  are generally considered 
valid goals of macroeconomic  policy, it would  be hard to find consensus 
that  either  of  these  uses  of  policy  was  inappropriate.  Given  that 
throughout  most of our sample  period  inflation was  at levels  that (both 
at the  time  and  in retrospect)  were  viewed  as excessive,  it is arguable 
that low  output  growth  was likely to be needed  at some  time to reduce 
inflation.  The only  issues  concern  the  timing  and  speed  of disinflation. 
Similarly, when  output  growth  is  low  and  inflation  is  low  or  falling, 
most  economists  would  probably  agree  that  expansionary  policy  is 
appropriate. Thus, the tightening  and loosening  of policy  around reces- 
sions  and recoveries  are hard to question. 
In contrast,  expansionary  policy  taken  in  face  of  a strong  economy 
and  of  inflation  that  is  high  or  rising  might  be  generally  viewed  as 
mistaken.  By  this  standard,  three  times  stand  out  as  periods  when 
policy  was  overly  expansionary:  1967-1968,  1972,  and  1986-1987. 
Growth was above normal in all three periods. Unemployment  was also 
low  to  moderate  in  each  case:  3.6% in  1967-1968,  5.5% in  1972, and 
6.5% in  1986-1987.  Yet  both  the  OLS  and  IV multipliers  imply  that 
policy  was  adding  considerably  to  real  growth  in  all  three  periods. 
Averaged  over  these  five  years,  the  OLS multipliers  imply  that mone- 
tary  policy  contributed  1.2  percentage  points  to  real  growth,  and 
discretionary  fiscal policy  contributed  0.5 percentage  points.  The  same 
numbers  for the  IV multipliers  are 2.4 percentage  points  for monetary 
policy  and 0.2 percentage  points  for discretionary fiscal policy.  The DRI 
multipliers  also imply  that monetary  policy  contributed  substantially  to 
growth  in these  years,  with  an average  contribution  of 0.6% per year. 
These multipliers imply, however,  that discretionary fiscal policy had an 
offsetting  effect of  -0.7  percentage  points,  so that the overall contribu- 
tion of policy  was  essentially  zero.31 
The nature  of the  expansionary  policies  differed  across the  episodes. 
The  1967-1968  and  1986-1987  episodes  involved  moderately  stimula- 
31.  As Figure 4 shows,  the DRI model  implies  that a decrease  in the surplus to GDP ratio 
has  a  negative  effect  on  growth  beginning  in  the  fifth  quarter  after  the  decrease. 
These  delayed  contractionary  effects  are the  main  source  of  the  model's  implication 
that  fiscal  policy  reduced  growth  in  1967-1968,  1972, and  1986-1987.  When  these 
effects  are  omitted,  the  DRI  multipliers  imply  that  discretionary  fiscal  policy  con- 
tributed just  -0.1  percentage  points  to average  growth  in  these  years. The  delayed 
contractionary  effects  of  fiscal  policy  are  also  the  main  source  of  the  estimated 
moderate  contribution  of prepeak  automatic  and  discretionary  fiscal policy  to output 
growth  in recoveries  reported  in Table 6. What  Ends  Recessions?  ?  53 
tive  policies  at relatively  late stages  in expansions.  The stimulus  in the 
1967-1968  period  stemmed  from  reductions  in  the  high-employment 
surplus  in 1965 and  1966 and from an absence  of consistent  changes  in 
the  nominal  federal  funds  rate in  the  face  of  rising  inflation  over  the 
period  1965-1967.  The  stimulus  in  1986 and  1987 was  the  result  of  a 
general  downward  trend in both the high-employment  surplus and the 
nominal  federal funds  rate, together  with  slight upward  movements  in 
inflation. The 1972 episode,  on the other hand, resulted  from extremely 
expansionary  monetary  policy  in  the  wake  of the  mild  1969 recession. 
In the three quarters after the recession  ended  in the second  quarter of 
1970,  the  nominal  federal  funds  rate  fell  from  7.88%  to  3.86%.  It 
fluctuated  irregularly over the next year, reaching a low  of 3.54% in the 
first quarter of  1972. Since  inflation  was,  if  anything,  rising  over  this 
period,  the  result was  that monetary  policy  was  extremely  stimulative. 
Despite  the  differences  in  the  nature  of  policy  across  these  episodes, 
they  are  united  by  the  fact  that  expansionary  policies  stimulated  an 
already  strong  economy  and,  thus,  set up  the  inflation  that ultimately 
induced  later tightenings. 
5.2 THE  PERSISTENCE  OF OUTPUT  FLUCTUATIONS 
A large recent literature examines  the persistence  of output  movements. 
The general  conclusion  of this research is that quarterly changes  in real 
GDP are highly  persistent.  The usual presumption  in interpreting  these 
findings,  either implicit or explicit, is that output  movements  driven by 
shifts in aggregate  demand  will not be very persistent (see, for example, 
Nelson  and  Plosser,  1982, and  Blanchard and  Quah,  1989). As a result, 
the  conclusion  that has been  drawn  from these  studies  is that supply- 
side  disturbances  must be a crucial source of fluctuations. 
Our  examination  of  postwar  monetary  and  fiscal policies  and  their 
contributions  to  output  movements  suggests  that  the  presumption 
underlying  this conclusion  should  be  reexamined.  There are extended 
periods  when  macroeconomic  policy-particularly  monetary  policy-is 
either  generally  expansionary  or  generally  contractionary.  And  our 
estimates  of policies'  effects imply  that the  impact  of any  given  policy 
movement  on  the  economy  is  quite  protracted.  Thus,  monetary  and 
fiscal policies' contributions  to output  movements  may be highly  persis- 
tent. 
To  examine  this  issue  formally,  we  perform  a bivariate  experiment 
analogous  to  the  univariate  one  performed  by  Campbell  and  Mankiw 
(1987a).  Campbell  and  Mankiw  estimate  some  simple  processes  for 
overall  output  growth,  and  then  use  these  processes  to  address  the 
question  of  how  forecasts  of  the  path  of  output  should  be  revised  in 
response  to an output  innovation.  Analogously,  we  decompose  output 54- ROMER  & ROMER 
growth  into  the  estimated  contributions  of discretionary  policy  and  of 
other factors and then  ask how  one should  revise the forecasted  path of 
output  in response  to innovations  in each of these  two  components. 
Specifically,  we  estimate  a bivariate vector  autoregression  (VAR) us- 
ing  these  two  variables  with  four  lags  and  then  find  the  effects  of 
shocks  to  each  of  the  variables.  The  sum  of  a  shock's  effects  on 
policy-related  and nonpolicy-related  growth  represents  its effect on the 
path  of output  growth.  Cumulating  these  growth  effects then  gives  its 
effect on  the path of the log  of total output. 
The  results  suggest  that  output  innovations  stemming  from  macro- 
economic  policies  have  considerably  more  persistent  effects than  inno- 
vations  coming  from  other  sources.  Consider,  for example,  the  results 
when  the  OLS  multipliers  are  used  to  estimate  the  component  of 
output  growth  that  is due  to  monetary  policy  and  discretionary  fiscal 
policy  and, thus, to decompose  output  growth  into  policy  and nonpol- 
icy components.  The VAR implies  that the overall output  effect of a 1% 
shock  to the  nonpolicy  component  of output  peaks  at 1.3% two  quar- 
ters after the  shock  and  then  gradually  declines.  The  effect  returns  to 
1% after six quarters and is 0.7% after 12. This relatively low  persistence 
occurs because  the policy  component  of output  growth  responds  nega- 
tively  to  the  nonpolicy  component:  Policymakers  respond  to  positive 
output  innovations  by  tightening.  The  overall  effect  of  0.7% after  12 
quarters, for example,  reflects a contribution  of  + 1.5% from the nonpol- 
icy component  and an offsetting  contribution  of  -  0.8% from the policy 
component. 
The results imply  that independent  changes  in the policy  component 
of  output  growth,  in  contrast,  have  extremely  persistent  effects.  A  1% 
innovation  raises overall output  by 2.3% after 4 quarters and 2.4% after 
12. This strong persistence  arises both because  the policy  component  of 
growth  is highly  serially correlated and because  the  nonpolicy  compo- 
nent  is  essentially  unresponsive  to  the  policy  component.  The  strong 
serial correlation of the policy  component,  in turn, stems from the facts 
that  the  estimated  effects  of  real  interest  rate  changes  are  quite  pro- 
tracted and  that the real interest  rate reverts to its mean  only  slowly.32 
32.  It is of course  possible  that the  output  effects  of a shock  to the  policy  component  of 
output  are eventually  reversed.  Indeed,  our  procedure  for estimating  the  effects  of 
policy  imply  that if shocks  to the  real interest  rate and  the  surplus-to-GDP  ratio are 
eventually  completely  undone,  the long-run  effect of a shock to the policy component 
of  output  is zero.  As is  well  known,  however,  data  from  moderate  time  spans  can 
shed  little  light  on  the  effects  of  innovations  at  long  horizons,  and  conventional 
estimates  of the  persistence  of fluctuations  (such  as Campbell  and  Mankiw's)  reflect 
effects  at  moderate  rather  than  long  horizons  (see,  for  example,  Christiano  and 
Eichenbaum,  1990).  For  that  reason,  we  focus  on  the  effects  of  innovations  over 
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Using  the  IV and  DRI multipliers  to decompose  output  growth  into 
the  policy  and  nonpolicy  components  produces  generally  similar  re- 
sults.  The  IV multipliers  imply  that  a  1% innovation  to  growth  stem- 
ming  from sources  other  than  policy  raises the level  of output  after 12 
quarters by 0.8%, while  a 1% innovation  to the policy  component  raises 
output  after 12 quarters by  1.9%. With the  DRI multipliers,  the  figures 
are 1.2% and  2.4%. Thus, these  alternative  sets  of multipliers  continue 
to  imply  that  the  policy-induced  output  movements  are  considerably 
more persistent  than other output  movements. 
Taken together,  the  results using  all three  sets of multipliers  suggest 
that  the  source  of  the  high  degree  of  persistence  of  aggregate  output 
fluctuations  may be quite mundane.  Rather than reflecting fundamental 
characteristics of fluctuations,  it may simply reflect the fact that shifts in 
macroeconomic  policy  and their effects on the economy  are often  quite 
protracted.33 
6. Conclusions 
Our  central  conclusion  is  that  monetary  policy  alone  is  a  sufficiently 
powerful  and  flexible  tool  to  end  recessions.  In nearly  every  postwar 
recession,  policymakers  have  been  quick to discern  the  onset  of reces- 
sion  and  have  responded  to  the  downturn  with  rapid  and  significant 
reductions  in nominal  and real interest  rates. Plausible estimates  of the 
size and speed  of the effects of these  interest rate cuts suggest  that they 
were  crucial to the subsequent  recoveries. 
Discretionary  fiscal policy,  in contrast,  does  not  appear  to  have  had 
an important role in generating  recoveries. Fiscal responses  to economic 
downturns  have  generally  not occurred until real activity was  approxi- 
mately  at its trough.  In addition,  these  responses  have  generally  been 
limited  to moderate  actions that could  be undertaken  without  congres- 
sional approval or for which  congressional  approval was easy to obtain. 
As  a result,  our  estimates  suggest  that  fiscal actions  have  contributed 
only  moderately  to recoveries.  Policymakers have  succeeded  in making 
large  adjustments  in  fiscal  policy  in  response  to  recessions  only  in 
unusual  circumstances.  Thus, the  historical record contradicts the view 
that  fiscal  policy  is  essential  to  ending  recessions  or  ensuring  strong 
recoveries. 
While  monetary  policy  has  been  crucial  to  postwar  recoveries,  our 
results  suggest  that  the  overall  record  of  discretionary  monetary  and 
33.  Our results are consistent  with the findings  of Campbell and Mankiw (1987b) that the 
component  of  output  movements  that  is  correlated  with  movements  in  the  unem- 
ployment  rate  is  at  least  as  persistent  as  general  output  fluctuations.  West  (1988) 
shows  that  a  largely  conventional  model  can  imply  that  fluctuations  driven  by 
aggregate  demand  movements  are relatively  persistent. 56  ROMER  & ROMER 
fiscal policy  is less impressive.  One  apparent  error that has been  made 
on  several  occasions  is  for  policymakers  to  become  overly  concerned 
about the  possibility  of weak  growth  during  expansions  or excessively 
optimistic  concerning  the  prospects  for  expansion  without  triggering 
inflation  and, therefore,  to adopt  excessively  expansionary  policies.  The 
common  pattern during recoveries  is for there to be modest  increases in 
interest  rates and  little  change  in  the  high-employment  surplus.  How- 
ever,  in  periods  where  policymakers  have  been  concerned  about  low 
growth,  they  have  often  undertaken  major fiscal  expansions  or  have 
kept  nominal  interest  rates  constant  or declining  in  the  face  of  rising 
inflation.  On  several  occasions,  such  expansionary  policies  appear  to 
have  contributed  substantially  to above  normal growth. 
Finally, our analysis  of the  effects  of policy  may  help  to explain  the 
persistence  of  movements  in  aggregate  output.  We find  that the  large 
degree  of persistence  of movements  in real GDP appears  to result to a 
considerable  extent  from extremely  high  persistence  of the contribution 
of  policy  changes.  Thus,  policy  is  not  only  the  source  of  postwar 
recoveries,  but  also  the  source  of  the  puzzling  serial  correlation  in 
aggregate  output. 
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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  advances  a  startling  and  intriguing  proposition:  Active, 
systematic  monetary  policy  ended  postwar  recessions.  It is the latest in 
a  series  of  provocative  papers  in  which  Christina  and  David  Romer 
have  revived  some  of  the  methods  and  views  of  Friedman,  and 
Friedman and Schwartz. 
In evaluating  this work, I am naturally drawn to Friedman's critics. In 
particular, Tobin's  (1970)  "Post  Hoc  Ergo  Propter  Hoc"  and  Kareken 
and  Solow's  (1963) "Lags in Monetary  Policy" outlined  the issues  that, 
formalized  by  Sims  (1972)  and  others,  today  define  the  standard 
methodology  for  evaluating  monetary  policy.  They  complained  about 
causal inferences  from  Friedman's  historical  analysis  and  regressions. 
They  demonstrated  the  central  identification problems.  In  particular, 
Tobin showed  how  models  with  no  structural or policy-invariant effects 
of  money  on  output  are  consistent  with  Friedman's  evidence.  They 
complained  that Friedman refused  to write  down  any  models or tell us 
what  the identifying  restrictions  are. 
These  issues  are at least  30 years  old.  Like the  prisoners  who  have 
told jokes so often they refer to them by number, I should be able to say 
"Identification,"  "Exogeneity,"  and  "Invariance"  to  provoke  knowing 
laughter.  But after so many  years, perhaps  we  remember  the  numbers 
but forget the jokes. 
2.  Identifying "Policy Actions" 
Much  of this paper  presents  a history  of "policy  actions" in recessions. 
This  work  has  many  precedents.  Among  others,  Kareken  and  Solow 
discussed  the  "inside  lag"  of  monetary  policy  at  length.  Like  Romer 
and  Romer, Kareken and  Solow  found  that the Fed typically  perceives 
the  onset  of  a  recession  quickly.  They  also  found  that  the  Fed  often 
delays  a response  out of fear of still high  inflation. 
I thank  Chris Acito  and  Bob Lucas for comments  on  an  early  draft. I especially  thank 
Martin  Eichenbaum,  who  caught  what  would  have  been  an  embarrassing  error.  My 
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Romer  and  Romer's  history  basically  collects  statements  by  Federal 
Reserve  officials about the  state of the  economy,  and what  policies  the 
officials  thought  appropriate.  For  example,  here  is  what  Romer  and 
Romer say about  annus horribilis 1980: 
At every meeting of the FOMC  from  July 1979  through the Summer  of 1980,  the 
Federal Reserve believed that a recession was either under way or was immi- 
nent. Concern about inflation and money growth, however, prevented policy- 
makers  from moving to lower interest rates until the spring of 1980.  Beginning 
in April 1980,  just after the actual peak in real GDP in the first quarter  of 1980, 
the  combination of  weak money  growth and unfavorable news  about real 
output caused the FOMC  to lower the federal funds rate sharply. The FOMC 
did not want to "exacerbate  recessionary  tendencies and the economy" and 
was concerned about "the risk that the contraction  would prove to be deeper 
than widely expected." 
The  historian  in  me  wants  to  question  this  history,  e.g.,  by  asking 
how  a collection  of  quotes  culled  from the  FOMC minutes  document 
statements  like "the  combination  of weak  money  growth  and unfavor- 
able  news  about  real  output  caused the  FOMC  to  lower  the  federal 
funds rate sharply" or how  this history is consistent  with  the last Romer 
and  Romer  (1989)  Macro Annual  paper  and  with  the  conventional 
wisdom  that the Fed  caused rather than reacted to events  in 1979-1980. 
Instead, let's take the history at face value and ask, what  can we learn 
from  it? Well,  I learned  that  Fed  officials are about  as  well  informed 
about  the  economy  as  the  average  number-watching  economist  and 
that  they  seem  to  advocate  countercyclical  policy.  This  is  useful  evi- 
dence.  As  we  will  see  later,  whether,  how  fast,  and  based  on  what 
information  the Fed reacts to output  and inflation is very important for 
understanding  the time series. VARs yield  fragile estimates  of the Fed's 
reaction function,  so corroborating historical evidence  is helpful. 
But  what  does  this  history  tell  us  about  the  ends of  recession? It 
documents  the Fed's attempts  at systematic policy,  actions  that the Fed 
takes  predictably  as a function  of output  and inflation. It's not clear that 
systematic  policy  has any  real effect at all. If it does,  it's not  clear why 
we  need  to  look  for policy  actions. My  old  undergraduate  ISLM text- 
book  trumpets  "automatic  stabilizers" as the  great  success  of  postwar 
policy,  precisely  because  they  don't  require  conscious  recognition  or 
action by policymakers.  Monetary, nominal  GNP, or interest rate target- 
ing  rules  are  often  advocated  to  work  in  the  same  way.  Finally, 
predictable actions  are precisely  those  actions  whose  correlations  with 
other  events  have  dubious  causal  interpretations.  As Sims (1992) asks, 
does  the  cock's crow  cause  the  sunrise? For this reason,  historical and 60 ?  COCHRANE 
econometric  analyses  search  for  innovations  or  unpredictable  move- 
ments. 
Thus,  "policy"  could  have  "ended  recessions"  with  no  "policy  ac- 
tions,"  and  "policy  actions"  could  have  occurred  without  helping  to 
"end  recessions."  The pure history  of policy  actions can tell us that the 
Fed reacted to  output and inflation, but doesn't  tell us if output reacted 
to  the  Fed. Hence,  it does  not  teach  us  much  about  what  caused  the 
ends  of recessions. 
3. Measuring  the Contribution  of Policy 
Since  the  history  is  inconclusive,  the  heart  of  this  paper  is  a  set  of 
calculations of  how  much  postpeak  declines  in  real  rates  increased 
subsequent  output.  The  crucial  ingredient  of  these  calculations  are 
econometric  estimates of dynamic  "policy  multipliers." 
3.1 OLS ESTIMATES 
Romer and  Romer first run  OLS regressions  of  output  growth  on  the 
real federal funds  rate, 
8  8 
AYt  =  E  yffft-j  +  E  y  t-j  + Et,  (1) 
j=l  j=1 
and on the high-employment  budget  surplus. They use this equation  to 
simulate  output  under  different paths  for the federal funds  rate. 
This  kind  of  policy  analysis  also  has  a long  history.  Most  notably, 
Anderson  and  Jordan  (1968)  ran  similar  regressions  and  calculated 
output  paths  under  alternative  policies.  They  obtained  similar multipli- 
ers  and  reached  similar monetarist  conclusions.  Their paper  even  has 
"Monetary  and  Fiscal  Actions" in  the  title.  This is known  as the  "St. 
Louis Fed" approach,  in their memory.  (See the discussion  in Sargent's 
1979 textbook, p. 287.) Anderson  and Jordan used  monetary  aggregates 
rather than an estimate  of the real fed funds  rate,1 and  omitted  lagged 
output,  but these  differences  are irrelevant for what  I have  to say. 
1.  One  can say both good  and bad things  about this choice. Here's a small sample. Good: 
The  real federal  funds  rate can  only  change  in  response  to  a monetary  tightening  if 
money  has some nonneutral  effect. In the end of a hyperinflation,  the real interest rate, 
properly  measured,  would  not  change,  so  no  change  in  monetary  policy  would  be 
registered.  Bad: Of course  we  are now  running  one  endogenous  variable on  another. 
The real funds rate is a complicated  and imperfectly  measured  construct; it is undoubt- 
edly  determined  by  a complex  lag of monetary  policy  and real events;  and,  thus,  it is 
dubiously  under  the  Fed's  control.  See  Romer  and  Romer's  plot  1: It is  sometimes 
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Kareken and Solow  (1963) already criticized this method: 
Imagine an economy buffeted by all kinds of cyclical forces,...  Suppose by 
heroic... variation  in the money supply...  the Federal  Reserve  manages deftly 
to counter all disturbing  impulses and to stabilize  the level of economic activity 
absolutely. Then, an observer... would  see  peaks and troughs in  monetary 
change accompanied  by a steady level of aggregate  activity.  He would presum- 
ably conclude that monetary policy has no  effects at all, which would be 
precisely the opposite of the truth. 
We tend  to make  this kind  of point  quantitatively  today, by construct- 
ing  models  and  seeing  what  aspects  of those  models  are recovered  by 
our empirical procedures. 
3.1.1 Contemporaneous  Shock  Identification  Suppose  output  is affected by 
the  monetary  policy  variable  m  (a  monetary  aggregate,  the  real  or 
nominal  federal  funds  rate,  or  other  indicator  of  policy)  and  other 
serially correlated disturbances,  so 
oo  oo 
t =  E  aymjmt-j +  ayyjyt-j +  Et  (2) 
j=0  j=l 
Suppose  the  Fed  reacts  to  output,  as  the  Kareken  and  Solow's  and 
Romer and Romer's historical evidence  suggests, 
00oo  oo00 
mt=  E  ammjmt-j  +  E  amyjyt-j  +  8t.  (3) 
j=l  j=0 
Now  we  can solve  Equation (3) for output,  yielding 
1  \,amm]  m  a fyj  1  o 
Yt  -a  mt-  E  a  _j"  -  MYJ  (4)  -t-  =m  t  -E  am  E  Yt-j  t. 
amy amyO  =  1  myO  myO  O 
Note that Equations (2) and (4) have exactly the same list of right-hand 
variables! Will OLS recover Equation (2), the effect of money  on output, 
or  Equation  (4),  the  Fed  feedback  rule?  Well,  OLS  sets  the  residual 
orthogonal  to  the  right-hand  variables. But since  contemporaneous  m 
appears in the  y  equation  and vice versa,  neither e  nor  8 is orthogonal 
to the right-hand  variables. 
This is a classic simultaneous  equations  system.  To recover  estimates 
of the  structural parameters, we  need  an  identifying assumption. Romer 
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a  ym  =  0. Given this additional  assumption,  OLS does recover the struc- 
tural  Equation  (1).  But  consider  what  happens  if  their  identifying 
assumption  is wrong.  What if  m can affect y  within  the quarter? Then, 
OLS  recovers  mongrels, combinations  of  the  structural  output  effects 
and  the  Fed feedback  rule. For example,  if  cr2 =  0, then  OLS estimates 
recover the feedback  rule and have  nothing  to do with  the effects of  m 
on  y! 
Romer and Romer treat these  as minor issues and note  the results are 
similar if  contemporaneous  m  is  included.  But  the  issue  is  central in 
deciding  what  OLS has recovered  in  either  case. If both  m and  y  can 
affect  each  other  within  the  quarter,  regressions  with  and  without 
current  m will both be mongrels.  And if the estimated  multipliers look a 
lot like one's priors about the effects of  m on  y, they  also look a lot like 
my priors about the  negative  of the Fed feedback  rule! 
Romer and  Romer have  in fact estimated  the  first row  of a bivariate 
vector  autoregression,  assuming  a  recursive  orthogonalization  of  the 
contemporaneous  error covariance  matrix with  output  first. This identi- 
fication  issue  bedevils  the  VAR literature,  and  so  much  thought  has 
gone  into  it. Most VARs using  monetary  aggregates  make the  opposite 
assumption-they  presume  that  the  Fed  cannot  see  and  act  quickly 
enough  to  make  m  respond  to  y  within  the  quarter rather than  the 
other  way  around.  Romer  and  Romer  are  primed  to  contribute  con- 
structively  to this debate; their historical analysis can tell us a lot about 
whether  the identification  stories used  in the VAR literature hold water. 
They should  do so. 
3.1.2 Omitted Variables  Suppose  now  that other variables z,  are helpful 
in forecasting  output  and  that the Fed watches  them  as well.  To make 
matters simple,  ignore  contemporaneous  correlation: 
00  00  00 
Yt =  E  aymimt-j  +  E  ayyjyt-j  +  E  ayzjzt-j  +  'it  (5) 
j=l  j=l  j=l 
00  00  00 
mt =  E  ammjmt-j +  amyjyt-j  +  E  amzjzt-j +  Vt.  (6) 
j=1  j=1  j=1 
What does  this system  predict for the projection  of  y  on lagged  y  and 
m, Equation (1)? The error term is  Et =  Ej=layzjzt_j  +  lt.  By virtue  of 
Equation (6), lags of  m are correlated with  this error term, so Equation 
(1) yields  inconsistent  estimates  of the  structural effects  aym and  ayy in 
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Romer and Romer acknowledge  but belittle the possibility  of "down- 
ward  bias"  in  the  estimate  of  aym. However,  the  problem  is  really 
identification.  The estimated  lag polynomials  in a regression  of  y  on  m 
are mongrels, combinations  of all the lag polynomials  in the system. One 
can  obtain  Romer  and  Romer's  regressions  from  systems  in  which 
money  has  no effect on  output;  modern  versions  of Tobin's "Post Hoc 
Ergo Propter Hoc" example will deliver this result. Thus, this "bias" can 
be upward  or downward  or both (at different lags). 
Are omitted  variables quantitatively  important? The question  is sim- 
ply  whether  one  can  improve  output  forecasts  by  using  variables 
beyond  lags of output  growth  and federal funds  changes,  and whether 
the  Fed watches  more  than  these  variables in setting  monetary  policy. 
Again, the VAR literature has faced this problem. Many other variables 
do significantly help to predict output  growth  and the path of monetary 
policy  variables. "Level"  variables, including  the  consumption/output 
ratio, the  term spread,  and  the  default  spread  are prime examples  (see 
Cochrane,  1994b). And  analysis  of the  Fed's operating  procedures  and 
history,  by  Romer and  Romer and  others,  convinces  one  that  the  Fed 
obsessively  watches  an enormous  number  of economic  variables when 
setting  policy.  Thus,  this  is not  an  in-principle  argument:  A few  easy 
regressions,  the  lessons  of  a  large  and  well-known  literature,  and 
Romer and Romer's own  historical analysis  are convincing  that left-out 
variables are a serious  problem in Equation (1). 
Finally, channels  for mongrel  coefficients  beyond  Fed  feedback  may 
be  even  more  important.  For  example,  lower  output  leads  to  lower 
money  demand  and,  hence,  lower  interest  rates.  The  standard  real 
business  cycle  model  predicts  a dynamic  relation between  low  output 
and low  (real) interest rates in response  to a low  technology  shock. 
3.2 INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES  ESTIMATES  AND ROMER-ROMER  DATES 
To mitigate the previous  problems with  Equation (1), Romer and Romer 
estimate  it using  the Romer-Romer  (1989) dates and the Boschen-Mills 
index  as instruments.  The results are quite similar to the OLS results. 
But the Boschen-Mills  index  is just another  measure  of the stance  of 
monetary  policy,  so there is no reason  it should  be less correlated with 
the  error term than the federal funds  rate. 
The Romer-Romer  index is "a dummy  variable equal to one  on dates 
of apparent  shifts by the Federal Reserve to policies  designed  to reduce 
inflation...."  But  it is  hard  to  believe  that  the  Fed  ignores  output  in 
making  such  a  decision.  Romer  and  Romer's  reading  of  the  FOMC 
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This is an important issue, and I wish  Romer and Romer were clearer 
about  what  their  dates  mean.  As  I read  it,  they  believe  that  the  Fed 
follows  feedback  rules,  which  I can  simplify  for  the  purposes  of  this 
discussion  to something  like 
mt =  ai(L)Yt  +  bi(L)t,'  i = "growth"  or"inflation." 
Sometimes,  the  Fed  is  more  concerned  with  fighting  recessions  or 
maintaining  output  growth.  This  is  more  than  just  a  time  in  which 
inflation  is low,  so that the contribution  of the  b(L)rrt  term is low;  this 
is  a  regime  in  which  bi(L)  itself  is  small  or  zero,  so  that  even  high 
inflation  would  not  spur the Fed into  action. At other times, the Fed is 
more concerned  with  reducing  inflation. Again, this is more than just a 
time  in  which  output  is  high  so  that  an  a(L)yt  term  is  small; it  is  a 
regime in which  the  a  i(L) coefficients are small or zero. A Romer-Romer 
date, then,  is a time  in which  the  Fed  switched from the  large  ai(L)  to 
the large  bi(L) regime. 
Here is the  fundamental  problem. To use  these  dates  as instruments, 
it  does  not  matter  whether  the  new  regime places  no  emphasis  on 
output-whether  ai(L)  =  0 in the new  regime-it  matters whether  the 
change in regime  is made  without  regard to the current state of output, 
anticipated  future  output,  or  other  variables  correlated  with  output. 
This is what  I find  hard  to believe.  No  disinflation  event  came  in  the 
depth  of  a depression!  It is the  crucial piece  of  evidence  and  it is not 
addressed  by Romer and Romer's historical analysis. 
3.3 IDENTIFICATION  OF POLICY-INVARIANTS  AND AN APPEAL 
FOR  THEORY 
Even if the regression  is impeccably  specified,  a fundamental  identifica- 
tion ambiguity  remains and requires us to spell out our monetary  model 
or compare  data from different  regimes. 
Kareken  and  Solow  knew  of  the  problem:  "...  One  cannot  deduce 
conclusions  about  the  effects  of monetary  policy  or about  their timing 
without  making  some  hypothesis,  explicit  or implicit,  about  what  the 
course  of events  would  have  been  had  the  monetary  authorities  acted 
differently."  Tobin showed  us  how  a model  in which  money  is totally 
passive  can  account  for  Friedman's  reduced-form  evidence.  Sargent 
(1976) formalized  the point  more recently. 
Here  is a simple  example.  Suppose  the  structural relation between  a 
monetary  policy  variable  mt and output  Yt is given  by 
Yt = 
ayu(L)(mt  -  Et_1mt)  + aym(L)mt +  ayE(L)et, Comment  ?  65 
and the  feedback  rule is given  by 
mt  =  amy(L)yt  +  amb(L)8t. 
(To keep  the algebra simple  and to emphasize  that orthogonalization  is 
not the issue,  suppose  that  amy(0) =  0, a  y(0)  = am(0)  =  1.) 
This model  nests two  interesting  special cases: (1) If aym(L) =  0, then 
only  unanticipated  money  affects  output.  The  path  of  output  is  com- 
pletely unaffected  by  the  Fed's policy  rule,  amy(L) and  am,I(L);  alterna- 
tive  postpeak  paths  for the  funds  rate have  no effects  on  output;  and 
the  moving-average  representation  (impulse-response  function)  is 
policy-invariant.  (2) If ay,(L)  =  0, then  there  is no  distinction  between 
anticipated  and unanticipated  money;  different  feedback  rules  can sta- 
bilize  or  destabilize  output;  and  the  autoregressive representation  is 
policy-invariant. 
Unfortunately,  the Appendix  proves the following  proposition:  ayu(L) 
and aym(L) are not separately  identified. 
No regression  can distinguish  whether  the true "policy  multiplier" is 
that  estimated  by  Romer  and  Romer  or  zero. We  must, impose  some 
theory  or "identifying  restriction" to get an answer. 
Romer  and  Romer  implicitly  assume  that  there  is  no  distinction 
between  anticipated  and unanticipated  money:  a  y(L)  =  0. In this case 
(and  with  the  orthogonalization  assumption,  and  the  absence  of other 
variables)  the  regression  of  y  on  lagged  m  and  y  does  yield  the 
structural effects of money,  aym(L) (see  the Appendix). 
Is this assumption  sensible? Many economists  do seem to believe  that 
anticipated  or systematic  policy  can  have  real effects.  However,  some 
monetary  policies  have  no effects: the ends  of hyperinflations,  currency 
revaluations,  and policies  in countries  with  high  and variable inflation. 
Thus, we  need  a view  of money  that explains why  monetary  policy  does 
have  effects in some  circumstances  and  does not in others. Most mone- 
tary models  that can  explain  both  sets  of  observations  give  no  role  to 
systematic  policy  (beyond  inflation-tax effects). And there are few  clean 
experiments  to  help  us,  aside  from  reforms  and  hyperinflations.  The 
year 1979 is often trumpeted  as an announced  deflation, but consumers 
had been  subjected  to many  announcements;  only  if everyone  believed 
the  announcement  does  it count.  One  needs  to  document  the  state of 
people's  expectations,  not  the  muddy,  contradictory,  and  wolf-crying 
statements  of Fed  officials. For these  reasons,  I venture  that few  of us 
would  go  so  far  as  to  assume  that  there  is  no  distinction  between 
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I don't want to rehash the old arguments over anticipated versus 
unanticipated monetary policy. Perhaps Romer and Romer do want to 
assume there is no distinction. The point is that the assumption identi- 
fying what is policy-invariant  is crucial,  so it needs to be explicit and 
linked  to  a  monetary  theory that can  explain the  wide  variety of 
correlations  between real and monetary variables  that we observe. Do 
Romer  and Romer  want everyone who does not immediately  buy their 
identifying assumption to dismiss their paper? Then they must argue 
for it. 
Even in reading history, the example shows how we need to carry 
along some other variable,  be it the way agents form expectations, the 
average duration of nominal contracts, or the costs of printing new 
menus, that differentiates  the United States in 1979 from Germany in 
1921 or Brazil  in 1994.  And we need a monetary theory  (or even a view 
or a story) to tell us what that state variable  is. 
3.4 DO THE  MULTIPLIERS  MAKE  SENSE? 
Finally,  look at the multipliers  in the Romer's  Figure 3. Can these be the 
structural  effects of monetary policy? 
The responses are permanent  and delayed.  No story for the effect of 
money on output that I know of produces such responses. If monetary 
policy does indeed have the plotted effects, we have absolutely  no idea 
how  it can do so! 
The responses are big. A one percent decline in real interest rates 
causes up to a 3% rise in output. If one thinks like a Keynesian for a 
minute, monetary policy is alleged to affect output through its effect on 
investment. Since investment is about 10% of output, these estimates 
require a 30% rise in investment for each percentage point decline in 
interest rates!  Even the 4-5% rise in investment required  if one takes an 
expansive view, including housing and durables, is much larger than 
the investment literature  suggests. 
The  VAR  literature has  a  lot  of  experience  with  the  federal 
funds-output system estimated  by Romer  and Romer.  (Cochrane  [1994b] 
presents a summary.)  Two variable VARs yield large, permanent, and 
delayed impulse responses, much like Romer and Romer's  multipliers. 
Fed  funds  shocks account for  50% and  more  of  output  variance. 
However, they  also yield  a "price puzzle"-prices  rise following a 
tightening. This has been ascribed  to the fact that the Fed also tightens 
when it gets news of future inflation.  When more variables  are added to 
the VAR,  in particular  commodity prices to control for the Fed's infor- 
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smaller and  more  transitory effects  of  a  federal  funds  shock  emerge. 
Federal funds  shocks  then  account  for 10% or less  of output  variation. 
Finally,  I  don't  think  Romer  and  Romer  take  the  multipliers  that 
seriously.  Why  stop  at  constant  rates  versus  the  historical  postpeak 
path?  Why  not  set  the  real  rate  at  minus  4% and  permanently raise 
output  by  20%? The  real  funds  rate  plot,  the  presumption  that  it  is 
under  the  Fed's  control,  and  the  multipliers  say  this  is possible!  Well, 
obviously,  there are constraints  on what  the  Fed can do; perhaps  such 
expansionary  policy might  eventually  lose its effect on output  and raise 
prices; perhaps  the real interest rate really isn't under the Fed's control, 
i.e., maybe we  don't really believe  the multipliers. 
In fact, Romer and  Romer  tell us  not  to  take many  aspects  of  their 
calculations  seriously,  such as the fact that the level  of output  is always 
higher  under  the  constant  interest  rate  rule.  Well  why  not?  If  the 
method  gives  a bad estimate of the two-year  response,  why  does it give 
a good  estimate of the one-year  response?  I don't think you  can have it 
both ways.  Either this is or it is not the menu  of options  available to the 
Fed. 
4. Do Recessions  Need "Ending?" 
The  very  title  of  this  paper  presupposes  that  "recessions"  need  "en- 
ding."  Most  of  macroeconomics  presumes  that  the  economy  reverts 
following  a shock  all by itself. For this reason, we  usually  focus  on  the 
shocks  that  start  recessions  and  their  propagation  mechanisms,  but 
almost  never,  until now,  on policies  and shocks  that  end recessions.  In 
order to believe  that policy  actions  "ended  recessions,"  we  need  solid 
evidence  that  postwar  recessions  ended  more  quickly  than  a  main- 
tained  economic  model  predicts.  This requires  an explicit  statement  of 
what  the model  is, and a little data analysis. 
In the  early  1960s, many  macroeconomists  thought  about  the  world 
through  a static ISLM model,  in which  "insufficient  aggregate  demand" 
could,  in  fact, persist  indefinitely  without  policy  action.2  However,  by 
the time Romer, Romer, and I were  undergraduates,  standard textbooks 
(Dornbush  and  Fischer) had  taken  the  natural rate part of Friedman's 
1968  address  to  heart,  and  added  ad  hoc  dynamics  by  which  the 
economy  would  revert to full employment. 
Standard stochastic  growth  models  in use  today  derive  their dynam- 
ics endogenously  and so make quantitative  predictions  about the speed 
with which  the economy  reverts following  a shock. The standard model 
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with a typical calibration3  predicts a half-life of 9.1 quarters  following a 
shock. This prediction is tied to parameters  of the model, labor's share 
and depreciation in particular.  If one allows for a higher than usual 
depreciation  of 20%  per year, the standard  model predicts a 5.8 quarter 
half-life. One can, of course, advocate other models or parameteriza- 
tions; one has to in order to think that recessions need "ending." But at 
least one standard model predicts that recessions end themselves, so I 
am not foolish in this presumption. 
The  data are also  consistent with  the  view  that  recessions end 
themselves. The simplest example is just based on a nondurable and 
services consumption/private output ratio autoregression, 
C  C 
ln-  =  -0.04+  0.872  In  - +et. 
t  (0.036)  t-1 
The half-life implied by  the  AR(1) coefficient is 5.07 quarters. More 
complex evidence from the VAR  and forecasting  literature  yields similar 
results: Movements in output that are not matched by movements in 
consumption are expected to die off quickly (e.g., see Cochrane,  1994a). 
Figure 1 graphs consumption and output through four recessions. 
The same message is apparent: Consumers expected  the recessions to 
end  promptly, which  is why  consumption is barely affected by  the 
declines in output. 
In the face of Figure 1, the only hope for the Romer-Romer story is 
that consumers expect recessions to end swiftly because they correctly 
anticipate that the Fed will step in and end them. However, to believe 
this, one  must again believe that completely anticipated, systematic 
policy can have real effects: One must explain how consumers antici- 
pate the monetary injection and its output effects, but how consumers 
and producers do not anticipate, expect, demand, or set higher prices. 
Finally, this graph and the associated VAR evidence also shows that 
the "persistence" of recessions that Romer and Romer seek to explain 
3.  The model  is 





Yt  (AtNt)aK-a  =  Ct  +  It 
Kt+1  =  (1  -  8)Kt  +  It. 
I calibrate  to  a  steady-state  return  on  capital  of  6% per  year,  growth  2% per  year, 
a- =  2/3,  8  =  10% per year,  3  of a day steady-state  leisure,  and  y =  1. Comment  ?  69 
Figure 1  LOG OUTPUT AND LOG CONSUMPTION  IN FOUR RECESSIONS. 
Output = GDP -  government  purchases.  Consumption  = nondurables  + 
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by  persistent  policy  isn't  there.  It  couldn't  be.  If  it  was,  recessions 
wouldn't  have "ended"!  Also, Christina Romer's earlier work convinced 
me that business  cycles ended  just as fast in the United  States before the 
Fed was there to step  on the gas at the trough,  and business  cycles end 
just as fast in other countries  with  less lead-footed  Feds than ours. 
5. Conclusions 
Here are some  of the  fundamental  questions  of macroeconomics: 
* Can changes  in the quantity of money  or a swap of debt for lump-sum 
taxes affect output?  If so,  how and in what circumstances? 
* Can systematic policy  offset other shocks? If so, why  are open-market 
operations  different  from currency reforms or the  ends  of hyperinfla- 
tions? 
*  Have attempts  at countercyclical  policy  in the  postwar  United  States 
stabilized  output?  Or  have  ham-handed  attempts  at  discretionary 
policy  actually  destabilized  output? 
To address these  questions,  the last 30 years have  seen  an outpouring 
of  empirical  work  on  the  effects  of  monetary  policy.  In  response  to 
Tobin  and  Solow's  concerns,  a  standard  methodology  has  emerged. 70 ?  COCHRANE 
One  adds  other  variables  to  the  output  equation;  one  adds  other 
equations  to control for Fed reaction, effects of output  on interest  rates 
and  so forth. One  can find exogenous  stochastic  processes  in the  error 
terms, and plot responses.  This is a VAR, of course. A small taste of this 
literature,  selected  because  the  references  happen  to  be  on  my  hard 
disk, includes  Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1991), Cochrane  (1994b), Gordon  and  Leeper (1993), King and Watson 
(1992), Sims (1992), and  Strongin  (1992). This literature is making  some 
progress: Many different identification  schemes  are converging  on simi- 
lar answers,  which  are, as I mentioned,  quite different from Romer and 
Romer's multipliers. 
The last 30 years have  also seen  an outpouring  of theoretical work on 
monetary  economics,  including  the  development  of  rational-expecta- 
tions,  cash-in-advance,  overlapping  generations,  and  sticky-price  and 
limited-participation  theories  of  money  and  its  potential  nonneutrali- 
ties.  Public  finance  has  produced  a  similarly  enormous  body  of  work 
evaluating  the  potential  for a fiscal nonneutrality.  This material is the 
heart of macroeconomic  training in every  Ph.D. program and  standard 
textbooks. 
Finally,  a  generation  of  monetary  economists  following  Friedman, 
including  Kareken  and  Solow,  Poole,  McCallum,  Meltzer,  and  many 
others,  has  explored  the  lags  of  monetary  policy,  how  the  Fed  makes 
decisions,  and what  variables are under  its control. 
Romer and Romer completely  ignore  all of this literature. There is not 
a mumble  of an apology  in the direction  of Tobin and Solow's  method- 
ological concerns, much less their formal statements  by Sims and others. 
Despite  its fundamental  importance  for identification,  there is not a hint 
of  a reference  to  monetary  theory,  even  David  Romer's  thesis  or  the 
collection  of papers in his book with  Greg Mankiw (1991). The empirical 
findings  of the  huge  VAR literature  go  unmentioned  (with  one  lonely 
exception).  The paper reads as if Romer and Romer are the first to ever 
examine  recognition,  decision,  and  action  lags  at the  Federal  Reserve. 
The underlying  economics,  like the  empirical methods,  is straight from 
the  1960s: The  paper  does  not  ask whether  the  economy  returns  to  a 
natural rate without  policy  intervention;  the  1970s challenge  that  sys- 
tematic  policy  might  have  no  real effects is not  even  dismissed,  to say 
nothing  of the  1980s challenge  from stochastic  growth  models  that not 
even  the beginnings  of recessions  need  policy  shocks. 
The  omission  is so  glaring it must be intentional.  Here  is my-quite 
sympathetic-interpretation.  The  last  30 years  of  macroeconomics  are 
difficult,  and  the  period  hasn't  provided  firm answers  to  the  earlier 
questions.  VARs address  Tobin and Solow's  criticisms, but lots of prob- Comment.  71 
lems remain. One has to identify  shocks from the residuals, consider the 
potential  effects of omitted  variables, and worry  about whether  the AR 
representation,  MA  representation,  or  some  combination  is  policy- 
invariant. Identification  isn't easy. The empirical results are sensitive  to 
specification;  the  standard  errors are big,  and  one  ends  up  with  the 
impression  that  the  data  really  don't  say  much  about  the  effects  of 
monetary  policy-which  may in fact be true. Theoretical models  seem 
equally  sensitive  to assumptions  and do not connect  easily with  empiri- 
cal work. 
We've  been  at  this  over  30  years, and  look  how  little  progress  we 
have  made  toward  answering  such  simple  questions!  Can understand- 
ing  monetary  policy  really be so difficult? Why  don't  we  just throw  all 
the  formal methodology  overboard  and  go  read the  history  of obvious 
episodes  and  see what happened? If, like  me,  you  have  struggled  with 
even  the  smallest VAR, this approach is enormously  attractive. 
Perhaps this is Romer and Romer's motivation.  But if so, I think that 
Romer and Romer are falling into the  same trap that ensnared  the rest 
of us.  Perhaps  they  started with  a desire  to just  look  at the  facts. But 
then  they  wanted  to  make  quantitative statements.  How  much would 
output  have  changed  if the  Fed followed  a different  policy?  To do  so, 
they  reinvented  the  St.  Louis  Fed  approach-an  econometric  tech- 
nique.  Despite  the  desire  to  "do  something  simple"  (David  Romer, 
during  the  discussion),  they  in  fact evaluated  policy  from the  autore- 
gressive  representation  of  an  output-fed  funds  VAR. Now  they  face 
Tobin  and  Solow's  classic  causal  and  identification  problems,  which 
cannot be addressed  by quotes  from FOMC meetings. 
Adam and  Eve in the  garden  of Friedman, they  have  taken  one  bite 
of  the  forbidden  econometric  fruit. But the  serpent  (me)  is still there, 
whispering  "go  ahead,  just  add  a few  more  variables;" "you  can  fix 
that, just put in a Fed reaction function;" "Why don't you write down  a 
few  structural  models  and  verify  what  your  regressions  are  picking 
up?" I don't see how  they  can resist taking bite after bite, until they  are 
cast out  of the  garden,  explicitly  running  VARs, and  working  hard for 
identification  with  the rest of us. 
I don't  mean  to disparage  history. Perhaps we  can read history with 
Solow  and  Tobin's  criticisms  in  mind  and  try  to  address  them  with 
historical  analysis.  Historical  analysis  should  be  able to  help  us  figure 
out  how monetary  policy  has nonneutral  effects. History contains  many 
different  regimes; by finding  relations between  money  and  output  that 
are invariant across these  regimes, we  can help  identify  which  relations 
are invariant to different  policies. For example,  Sargent's (1986) analysis 
of  the  ends  of  hyperinflations  brings  home  the  potential  neutrality  of 72  ?  COCHRANE 
some  large  monetary  events,  the  government's  intertemporal  budget 
constraint, and the fact that inflation is often and in many places a fiscal 
phenomenon,  in a way  that mountains  of formal papers do not. Finally, 
and  most  importantly,  Romer and  Romer's analysis  of FOMC minutes 
may be very  helpful  in sorting  out  how  the  Fed reacts to the  economy. 
But  a  successful  reading  of  history  can't  ignore Tobin  and  Solow's 
concerns,  and  a fundamentally  econometric  paper like this one  can do 
so even  less. VAR methods  did not evolve  as recreational mathematics. 
They  evolved  as the best response  a generation  of talented  economists 
could  come  up  with  to  genuine  and  serious  concerns,  expressed  30 
years  ago  by  Tobin  and  Solow,  with  the  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
methodology  that  Romer and  Romer are attempting  to revive.  I hope 
that Romer and  Romer can find a way  to address  these  concerns  with 
careful historical analysis rather than reinventing  the VAR wheel.  But if 
economic  history  simply  ignores  the history of economics,  it is doomed 
to repeat it. 
Appendix:  Identifying  Policy-Invariants 
The structural system  is 
Yt =  ayu(L)8t  +  aym(L)mt  +  aye(L)et 
mt =  amy(L)yt  +  am(L)8t. 
In addition  to the assumptions  mentioned  in the text, I assume  that all 
the structural lag polynomials  are invertible. 
Deleting  the (L) to simplify notation,  the moving  average representa- 
tion is 
aye  ayu 
+  aymamb 
Yt  _  1  -amyaym  1  -amyaym  Et 
m1  t  amyaye  ayumy  +  amb  t 
1  -  amyaym  1  -  amyym 
which  we  can compare  to that of an unrestricted  VAR, 
Yt  _  eye  OyVV  Et 
m  t 
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If  aym =  0, then 
ayu =  Oy^ 
If  only  unanticipated  money  matters  the  impulse  response-function 
recovers the structural response  of output  to money  innovations.  This is 
the usual  assumption. 
The autoregressive  representation  is 
+  ayuamy  _  (a  am  -  -  - 
aYE  am  a  y  amB  Yt  Et 
amy  1  mt  t 
ama  amb 
Compare the autoregressive  representation  to an arbitrary VAR 
Pyy  Pym  Yt  Et 
Pmy  f  mm  mt  t 
The second  row identifies  the money  reaction function  parameters  amy 
and  am^. The first row implies 
I  my  1  1 
ay(  + ayYu  a  )=  yY; --  aym + ayu  )  =  1ym' 
We can eliminate  ay, by dividing  the two  equations,  but then  we  have 
one  equation  in  the  two  unknowns  aym, and  ay,.  This  proves  the 
proposition  in the text. aym and  ay,  are not separately  identified. 
If  ayu =  0, there  is  no distinction  between  anticpated  and  unantici- 
pated money,  and Romer and Romer's multiplier recovers the structural 
effects of  m on  y, 
aym  =  -Iyyym 
Under  this  identification  assumption,  the  autoregressive representation 
is policy  invariant. 74  ?  FAIR 
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material  to  assign  to  students.  The  paper  considers  two  broad  ques- 
tions:  (1)  How  do  policymakers  behave?  (2)  How  do  policy  actions 
affect the economy?  The main theme  of my remarks is that Romer and 
Romer (RR) could  do  more  with  these  questions  than  they  have  done 
so far. 
Regarding  the  first question,  there is a large literature, which  RR do 
not  cite,  on  estimating  monetary-policy  reaction  functions.  Sometimes 
the  money  supply  is taken  as the  variable to be  explained,  and  some- 
times  a  short-term  interest  rate  is.  This  work  in  effect  considers  the 
behavior  of  the  monetary  authorities  over  all  phases  of  the  business 
cycle,  not  just  during  recessions,  as  RR focus  on.  I see  no  reason  to 
restrict the analysis  to recessions.  It is just as interesting  and important 
to  consider  how  the  authorities  behave  during  booms  and  normal 
times.  For example,  the  U.S.  economy  is  currently  in  more  or  less  a 
normal time, and  a key  current question  is whether  the Fed will begin 
to tighten  now  in anticipation  of a possible  overheating  of the economy 
in  the  future.  RR throw  away  a lot  of  useful  information  by  focusing 
only  on  recessions,  and  they  limit  their  analysis  by  using  only  tables 
instead  of an econometric  approach. At a minimum,  they  should  relate 
their work  to the reaction-function  literature. 
The previous  criticism does  not  pertain  to  the  examination  of fiscal- 
policy  actions,  where  there  is very  little work  trying  to  estimate  fiscal- 
policy  reaction functions.  As the RR discussion  documents,  fiscal-policy 
actions  do  not  appear  to be  systematic  enough  to allow  reaction  func- 
tions  to be estimated. 
The question  of how  policy actions affect the economy  is examined  in 
two  ways  in  this  paper.  One  is  to  compute  multipliers  from  the  DRI 
model.  This is a standard  approach  used  by  macroeconometric  model 
builders.  The other way  is to compute  multipliers  from a regression  of 
real  GDP  growth  on  a constant,  a dummy  variable  for  the  post-1973 
period,  eight  lags  of the  real GDP growth,  eight  lags  of the  change  in 
the real federal funds  rate, and  the current value  and  eight  lags of the 
change  in the high-employment  surplus  to GDP ratio. This equation  is 
estimated  both  by  OLS and  by  IV, where  the  instruments  for IV are 
indices  of  Federal  Reserve  policy.  I do  not  find  this  second  way  very 
interesting.  What theory would  lead this equation  to be a good  approxi- 
mation  to  the  true  reduced  form  equation  for real GDP  growth?  The 
equation  is  much  too  simple  to  be  compatible  with  theories  behind 
structural macroeconometric  models,  where  the  implied  reduced  form 
equations  are  much  larger  (and  generally  not  feasible  to  estimate 
directly).  The  equation  also  does  not  appear  to  be  comparable  with 
theories  used  in  real business  cycle  models  and  with  theories  that are 76 *  DISCUSSION 
part of  the  new  Keynesian  economics.  The  equation  is  too  ad  hoc  to 
allow  any confidence  to be placed  on the results of using  it. 
RR  use  the  estimated  multipliers  to  examine  the  recovery  from 
recessions,  but  again  there  is  no  particular  reason  to  focus  just  on 
recessions.  For  example,  one  can  use  a  macroeconometric  model  to 
compute  multipliers  for  any  period.  If  the  model  is  nonlinear,  the 
multipliers  will  differ at least somewhat  from period  to period, but it is 
straightforward  to  compute  multipliers  for any  desired  period  and  to 
run various  counterfactual  experiments. 
To  conclude,  the  two  main  questions  addressed  in  this  paper  are 
obviously  of  considerable  importance,  and,  while  the  paper  is  quite 
good  at describing  individual  episodes,  it has  not  carried the  analysis 
very far. It has failed to appreciate the amount  of work that has already 
been  done  in  this  area, especially  in the  macroeconometrics  literature. 
Attention  should  be  given  to  the  literature  on  estimating  monetary- 
policy  reaction  functions,  and  more  attention  should  be  given  to  the 
macroeconometric  tools  and  models  that are available to analyze  these 
questions. 
Discussion 
In  response  to  Cochrane,  Christina  Romer  agreed  that  identification 
was  the central issue.  They had  explicitly  gone  to the Fed records with 
this  in  mind,  looking  carefully  at what  the  Fed  said it was  doing  and 
what  it  knew  about  the  state  of  the  economy.  She  added  that  while 
there  may  be  reasons  why  their  regression  was  not  well  identified,  it 
was  much  more  plausible  that the  multipliers  are biased  downward  if 
the Fed is responding  to anticipations  of future income,  as Karaken and 
Solow  argue.  Regarding  Cochrane's  point  that  the  magnitude  of  the 
estimated  effects of the federal funds  rate on output  implied  an implau- 
sibly  large  investment  multiplier,  Romer noted  that  there  were  many 
other  channels  by  which  interest  rates  affect  output,  e.g.,  housing, 
consumer  durables, and inventories. 
Christina  Romer  also  stressed  that  an  important  objective  of  the 
paper  was  to  document  what  the  policies  actually  have  been  and  to 
uncover  the  motivations  behind  those  policies.  She noted  that this was 
not a trivial question,  given  the lack of consensus  on policy  recommen- 
dations,  particularly in the last recession. 
Olivier Blanchard questioned  the Romers' instrumental  variable strat- 
egy.  If the  problem  is that the  funds  rate depends  on  information  the 
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part of  the  new  Keynesian  economics.  The  equation  is  too  ad  hoc  to 
allow  any confidence  to be placed  on the results of using  it. 
RR  use  the  estimated  multipliers  to  examine  the  recovery  from 
recessions,  but  again  there  is  no  particular  reason  to  focus  just  on 
recessions.  For  example,  one  can  use  a  macroeconometric  model  to 
compute  multipliers  for  any  period.  If  the  model  is  nonlinear,  the 
multipliers  will  differ at least somewhat  from period  to period, but it is 
straightforward  to  compute  multipliers  for any  desired  period  and  to 
run various  counterfactual  experiments. 
To  conclude,  the  two  main  questions  addressed  in  this  paper  are 
obviously  of  considerable  importance,  and,  while  the  paper  is  quite 
good  at describing  individual  episodes,  it has  not  carried the  analysis 
very far. It has failed to appreciate the amount  of work that has already 
been  done  in  this  area, especially  in the  macroeconometrics  literature. 
Attention  should  be  given  to  the  literature  on  estimating  monetary- 
policy  reaction  functions,  and  more  attention  should  be  given  to  the 
macroeconometric  tools  and  models  that are available to analyze  these 
questions. 
Discussion 
In  response  to  Cochrane,  Christina  Romer  agreed  that  identification 
was  the central issue.  They had  explicitly  gone  to the Fed records with 
this  in  mind,  looking  carefully  at what  the  Fed  said it was  doing  and 
what  it  knew  about  the  state  of  the  economy.  She  added  that  while 
there  may  be  reasons  why  their  regression  was  not  well  identified,  it 
was  much  more  plausible  that the  multipliers  are biased  downward  if 
the Fed is responding  to anticipations  of future income,  as Karaken and 
Solow  argue.  Regarding  Cochrane's  point  that  the  magnitude  of  the 
estimated  effects of the federal funds  rate on output  implied  an implau- 
sibly  large  investment  multiplier,  Romer noted  that  there  were  many 
other  channels  by  which  interest  rates  affect  output,  e.g.,  housing, 
consumer  durables, and inventories. 
Christina  Romer  also  stressed  that  an  important  objective  of  the 
paper  was  to  document  what  the  policies  actually  have  been  and  to 
uncover  the  motivations  behind  those  policies.  She noted  that this was 
not a trivial question,  given  the lack of consensus  on policy  recommen- 
dations,  particularly in the last recession. 
Olivier Blanchard questioned  the Romers' instrumental  variable strat- 
egy.  If the  problem  is that the  funds  rate depends  on  information  the Discussion  ?  77 
Fed  has  about  future  output,  then  using  the  Romer-Romer  or 
Boschen-Mills  dummies  as instruments  will  not  solve  the  simultaneity 
bias, because  they  are also likely to depend  on what  the Fed expects  to 
happen  to output. 
Several people  questioned  using  the  federal  funds  rate as a measure 
of shifts in monetary  policy.  Larry Meyer thought  that interest rates are 
generally  not appropriate measures  of monetary  policy  given  the insta- 
bility of money  demand  over the last 20 years. Greg Mankiw  proposed 
an  alternative  story  in  which  movements  in  the  funds  rate  reflect 
information  revealed  by the Fed regarding  the  natural rate and, there- 
fore, future inflation, rather than the Fed simply  changing  its mind. He 
noted  that  this  would  explain  why  short  rates  and  long  rates  often 
seem  to move  in the  same direction,  as they  did in February when  the 
Fed raised the  funds  rate .25%, and  the  30-year bond  rate went  up by 
.75%. 
Christopher Sims agreed with  Mankiw and cited some  evidence  from 
the  VAR  literature  in  support.  He  noted  that  when  innovations  to 
interest  rates are identified  as policy  innovations,  they  appear  to  pro- 
vide  more information  about future inflation  rather than output.  Inter- 
est rate innovations  from reduced  form VARs typically  cause  output  to 
fall  but  inflation  to  rise.  But  when  the  interest  rate  innovations  are 
decomposed  and  only  the  component  that does  not  respond  to infor- 
mation  about  future  inflation  is used,  the  response  of output  is gener- 
ally weaker. Sims remarked that this would  be consistent  with a story in 
which  the  Fed raises interest  rates when  it perceives  inflationary  pres- 
sures induced  by negative  supply  shocks. In the Romers' reduced-form 
analysis,  the  subsequent  fall in  output,  therefore,  would  be incorrectly 
credited  to monetary  policy. 
Martin Eichenbaum  also  questioned  the  use  of  the  funds  rate as  a 
measure  of  policy.  He  noted  that  when  a  measure  of  inflationary 
pressure  such as commodity  prices is excluded  from a VAR system,  the 
1973 oil shock appears  as a large "policy  contraction" if innovations  in 
the  fed  funds  rate are interpreted  as the  policy  innovations.  However, 
when  commodity  prices  are  included  in  the  system,  the  innovations 
tend  to be much  smaller, once  again suggesting  that movements  in the 
funds  rate are likely to depend  on inflationary  shocks. 
Responding  to these  comments,  David  Romer said that the issue was 
largely  semantic.  The  question  addressed  in  the  paper  is what  would 
have happened  if the federal funds rate had remained constant through 
the cycle. Thus, monetary  policy in the paper is defined  as the effects of 
these  movements  in  the  funds  rate. Without  such  a baseline,  what  is 
meant by "monetary  policy" is ambiguous.  Romer added  that this view 78 ?  DISCUSSION 
of  monetary  policy  corresponds  with  what  the  Fed  says  it  is  doing 
during recessions-relieving  pressures  on reserves  in financial markets. 
In  response  to  Sims  and  Eichenbaum,  David  Romer  doubted  that 
supply  shocks  have  sufficiently large output  effects to bias the multipli- 
ers  upward.  A  negative  supply  shock  would  increase  prices,  which 
would  raise interest  rates, holding  constant  the  money  supply.  These 
interest  rate  changes  would  then  have  the  usual  impact  on  output 
through  aggregate  demand.  The  direct  effect  on  output  coming  from 
shifts  in  the  productive  capacity  of  the  economy  is likely  to  be  much 
smaller,  according  to  Romer.  Thus,  to  the  extent  that  the  important 
effects  come  through  interest  rates,  shocks  to  supply  variables  like 
commodity  prices are not a problem for the analysis  in the paper. 
Michael  Woodford  observed  that  looking  at  the  Fed  record  should 
allow  one  to  distinguish  times  when  the  Fed  is  less  worried  about 
inflation  because  they  think  a  recession  is  underway  and  likely  to 
continue  from times when  they  are less worried  about inflation because 
of  some  favorable  supply  side  development  that  will  increase  money 
demand.  Christina  Romer  answered  that  they  had  looked  for  such  a 
distinction,  and that there was  little evidence  that the Fed responds  on 
the basis of supply  shocks. The records indicate  that the Fed decides  to 
stimulate  when  it observes  that the  economy  is in a recession. 
Following  up  on  her  response,  Sims  noted  that  the  original  Romer 
and  Romer  study  was  based  on  looking  for discussion  of  inflationary 
pressure.  Supply  shocks would  have  an impact on Fed decisions  to the 
extent  that  they  were  reflected  in  these  discussions  of  inflationary 
pressure. However,  he  doubted  that the Fed records would  distinguish 
between  the particular sources  of inflationary  pressure,  so that looking 
at the Fed records would  not be useful  in getting  around  the potential 
identification  problem.  Christina Romer disagreed  with  this interpreta- 
tion  of  their  previous  work.  She  pointed  out  that  they  had  only 
identified  changes  in taste toward  inflation,  not simply  times when  the 
Fed had  reduced  inflation  just because  the  economy  was  overheating. 
Robert Gordon raised the issue  of sample instability. He noted  that if 
the  postwar  period  is  split  in  thirds,  not  only  does  the  effect  of  the 
funds  rate  on  output  decline  from  the  first to  the  third  part  of  the 
sample, but the lags also lengthen  considerably. This would  accord with 
the view  that the transmission  channel  of monetary  policy has changed. 
With the end  of disintermediation  and the movement  toward  a floating 
exchange  rate era, more  of  the  adjustment  comes  through  the  slower 
foreign  trade sector rather than the housing  sector. 
There  were  also  a  few  comments  regarding  fiscal  policy.  Meyer 
cautioned  that  reduced  forms  were  inadequate  for measuring  the  ef- 
fects of fiscal policy.  He  cited  simulations  Modigliani  had  run with  the Discussion  79 
MPS  model  demonstrating  the  bias  on  fiscal  policy  multipliers  from 
omitted  variables  in  reduced  form  systems.  Gordon  cautioned  against 
holding  interest  rates  constant  when  estimating  the  effects  of  fiscal 
policy.  The fiscal multipliers  will  depend  on  whether  monetary  policy 
accommodates  fiscal policy  or not.  For example,  the  1964 tax cut  was 
accompanied  by monetary  stimulus,  and, therefore,  the estimated  fiscal 
multipliers  were  large.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tax surcharge  in  1968 
was not followed  by a large contraction, because  it was accompanied  by 
expansionary  monetary  policy.  Eric Leeper also warned  against looking 
at  fiscal  policy  independently  of  monetary  policy.  He  noted  that  a 
permanent  shock to the real interest rate with no corresponding  change 
in  fiscal policy  would  end  up  violating  the  intertemporal  budget  con- 
straint. 